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PUBLIC USE IN THE DIRIGISTE TRADITION:
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC BENEFIT IN AN ERA OF
AGGLOMERATION
Steven J. Eagle*
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the development of eminent domain law, focusing
on the U.S. Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals’ approach
to the requirement that takings be for “public use.” It asserts that the Supreme Court’s public use doctrine is conceptually incomplete. In applying
that doctrine and its own precedents, the Court of Appeals acts in the
State’s tradition of dirigisme, and subordinates constitutional protections
for private property to centralized development. Its recent Goldstein and
Kaur opinions, uncritically supporting development for economic agglomeration, are the culmination of this approach.
The Article also discusses implications for public policy arising from
condemnation for transfer for private redevelopment, as hastened by government efforts to stimulate agglomeration. These include a lack of transparency, secondary rent seeking, possibilities of corruption resulting from
crony capitalism, and the inefficient use of public and private recourses.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about dirigisme, the “policy of state direction and control
in economic and social matters,”1 as it relates to state control of land use. It
also is about the Public Use Clause, its evasive conceptualization by the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Appeals’ reflexive application of the Supreme Court’s public use cases. As the French proverb
would put it, the Court of Appeals’ abrogation of its duty, together with an

1. 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 692 (6th ed. 2007).
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underlying policy that takes us down the path of inefficient land use and
crony capitalism, is worse than a crime—it is a blunder.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London2
makes clear that the exercise of eminent domain no longer is constrained
by traditional concepts of use by the public and the prevention of harm.
The New York Court of Appeals had reached that conclusion over forty
years earlier, by Cannata v. City of New York.3 However, the majority in
Kelo expressly assured that courts would confront abuses of eminent domain when and if they arise.
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,4 the Supreme Court implicitly assured that federal courts would review claims that state and local governments took private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, although those claims first
would have to be “ripened” in state court.5 Yet, as it turns out, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel means that the very act of ripening a case for federal
judicial review precludes its merits from being considered by the federal
court.6 As Professor Thomas Roberts observed, the landowners “understandable reaction” is that this “perpetrates a fraud or hoax.”7 “Ironically,
an unripe suit is barred at the moment it comes into existence. Like a tomato that suffers vine rot, it goes from being green to mushy red overnight.
It is never able to be eaten.”8 Roberts was not troubled by this apparent
bait-and-switch, being dismayed only by the fact that it “is surprising to
those who are misled by the language of ripeness, which suggests that the
state law suit is merely preparatory to a federal suit.”9
The State of New York has a tradition of strong government in many
areas, including land use regulation and takings.10 The New York Court of
Appeals has a tradition of deference to legislative and administrative ac-

2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
3. 182 N.E.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. 1962) (upholding condemnation of mostly vacant area
subdivided as to “prevent effective economic development”).
4. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
5. Id. at 186.
6. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
7. Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37, 71 (1995).
8. Id. at 72.
9. Id. at 67. Roberts characterized the state compensation prong of Williamson “as a
forum restricting rule, rather than a ripeness rule, provid[ing] more accuracy and safety.” Id.
at 39.
10. See Leah Moren Green, The Erie Canal and the American Imagination: the Erie
Canal’s Effects on American Legal Development, 1817-1869, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 117071 (2005).
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tions.11 Recent decisions by the Court of Appeals in Goldstein v. New York
State Urban Development Corp.,12 and Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,13 together with a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decision in the related Goldstein v. Pataki case,14 forebode that the
Supreme Court’s assurances in Kelo that courts will confront eminent domain abuse will prove as evanescent as the Williamson tomato that turns
from green to mushy red.
Ultimately, Goldstein and Kaur represent a continuation of the late Chief
Judge Charles D. Breitel’s declaration in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York15 that the State commands “the accumulated indirect
social and direct governmental investment” that provided most of its value
to physical property.16
I. DIRIGISME AND NEW YORK
Dirigisme has long antecedents in New York law and policy, dating to
the philosophical underpinnings of the State’s constitution and law.17 It is
perhaps best associated with the economic policies of New York’s Alexander Hamilton, who was convinced of the need and desirability of government involvement in the state and national economy.18 Hamilton wanted a
“government that would actively participate in the economy, regulating it
and creating monopolies as it saw fit[, seeking] not to create an economy
based on free enterprise, but one based on regulation and government intervention.”19 Despite Hamilton’s untimely death, his economic philosophy survived and prospered, and was put to almost immediate use in the

11. See generally Yonkers Comm. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975);
Denihan Enters. v. O’Dwyer, 99 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 1951); Kahlen v. State, 119 N.E. 883
(N.Y. 1918); Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837); Oneonta
Light & Power Co. v. Schwarzenbach, 150 N.Y.S. 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914), aff’d, 114
N.E. 1075 (N.Y. 1916).
12. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
13. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
14. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
15. 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
16. Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added). See infra Part IV.A for further discussion.
17. DOUGLAS AMBROSE & ROBERT W.T. MARTIN, THE MANY FACES OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON: THE LIFE & LEGACY OF AMERICA’S MOST ELUSIVE FOUNDING FATHER 26, 16970 (2006); EVAN CORNOG, THE BIRTH OF EMPIRE: DEWITT CLINTON AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1769-1828, at 104, 112-13, 116-17 (1998).
18. STEPHEN F. KNOTT, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MYTH 43, 54
(2002).
19. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 358 n.39 (1989).
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State’s support for the Erie Canal.20 Hamilton’s successors such as DeWitt
Clinton saw great potential economic benefits in completing the massive
infrastructure project, and when private attempts to finance and construct
the Erie Canal failed, they were eager to step in and direct the development
in the direction they saw fit.21 A successor to Governor Clinton, William
H. Seward, declared:
[I]t is not only the right but the bounden duty of the legislature to adopt
measures for overcoming physical obstructions to trade and commerce in
this state, and for furnishing to each region, as far as reasonable, practicable facilities of access to the great commercial emporium of the Union,
fortunately located within our own borders.22

In addition to sparking enthusiasm for major internal improvements, the
Erie Canal significantly altered the development of New York law.
Despite the previous century’s insistence on natural rights, of which property ownership was one, American citizens began to realize that this interpretation of property rights would impede the country’s ability to expand and prosper economically. To achieve this new economic
development, it was necessary for private individuals to sacrifice their
property for the canal.23

The requisition of private land by canal contractors produced a broader
definition of “public use” as well.24 In the area of education, another form
of infrastructure or capital, the French tradition of dirigisme was actually
imported from New York. The State early administered “Regents Examinations,” a precursor to what much later became commonplace standardized testing.25 Since 1784, the Regents have presided over the University
of the State of New York, and “are responsible for the general supervision
of all educational activities within the State.”26 It “is the nation’s most

20. See Roy G. Finch, The Story of the New York State Canals: Governor Dewitt Clinton’s Dream, NEW YORK STATE CANALS, available at http://www.canals.ny.gov/cculture/
history/finch/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
21. See id.
22. CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 97 (1905), available at http://nysl.nysed.gov/uhtbin/cgisirsi/T2UFEVhehH/NYSL/86450122/503/82982.
23. Green, supra note 10, at 1169 (citing CAROL SHERIFF, THE ARTIFICIAL RIVER 80-81
(Arthur Wang ed., 1996)).
24. Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823).
25. Regents examinations in selected high school subjects were authorized in 1876. See
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, History of Regent’s Examinations 1865-1987, http://www.p12.nys
ed.gov/osa/hsgen/archive/rehistory.htm (last visited, Jan. 3, 2010). The exams were responsive to the perceived “danger of superficiality and misdirection in the range of secondary
study.” Id. (quoting Dr. John E. Bradley).
26. New York State Board of Regents, NYSED.GOV, http://www.regents.nysed.gov/
(last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (emphasis added).
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comprehensive and unified educational system.”27 While it traces its antecedents to a 1784 statute establishing the Regents as a corporation empowered to govern Columbia College (now University) and subsequently established colleges, the provenance of the University of the State of New
York is even more fascinating.
This unique university was not a single institution of higher learning as at
Paris or Oxford. Rather, it served largely as a way of governing schools,
colleges and universities in a centralized, secular system of state control.
In addition, it controlled admission to higher education through the regents examinations given to secondary school children. This type of university had been advocated unsuccessfully in France for over two hundred
years.28

It is “no mere coincidence” that Napoleon’s University of France (1808)
took similar form.29 “If France may claim to have given New York the
ideal of a symmetrical state system of learning, New York may claim to
have returned to France the practical form of such a system, in its allinclusive university corporation.”30
This Article is not about dirigisme in education, but rather about the conflict between the duty of New York courts to enforce the State’s guarantees
of private property rights31 and its deference to centralized control of ownership and direction of land use. The New York and Federal constitutions
both state: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.”32 The courts of New York have generally interpreted this
provision quite broadly in favor of the government, a trend continued since
my last review a dozen years ago, in connection with the Court of Appeals’
1997 quartet of regulatory takings cases.33
27. Id. The University:
consists of all elementary, secondary, and postsecondary educational institutions,
libraries, museums, public broadcasting, records and archives, professions, Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities, and such other
institutions, organizations, and agencies as may be admitted to The University.
The concept of The University of the State of New York is a broad term encompassing all the institutions, both public and private, offering education in the State.
Id.
28. Roland G. Paulston, French Influence in American Institutions of Higher Learning,
1784-1825, 8 HIST. EDUC. Q. 229, 236 (1968) (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 237-38.
30. Id.
31. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (McKinney 2010).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
33. Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating From the “Rule
of Law,” 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345 (1998) [hereinafter Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet]; see also infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text (supplying a brief summary).
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At the time of the American Revolution, the immemorial power of the
sovereign to condemn private property for the health, safety, and welfare of
the people devolved upon the State. “The right to take private property for
public purposes does not depend upon any express provision in the charter
of government, but is an inherent attribute of sovereignty existing in every
independent state.”34 With the creation of entities like the Erie Canal
Commission in 1817, New York State took an active role in promoting
commerce and economic growth through their direction and instigation of
the means of that growth.35
Though not all were Federalists,36 the leading politicians of New York
State shared Alexander Hamilton’s belief in the end for strong government
direction and support of industry. In his major economic work, Report on
Manufactures,37 Hamilton strongly argued against Adam Smith’s perspective and the ability of free markets to effectively produce economic
growth.38 In Manufactures, Hamilton argued as an alternative to the unregulated free market that an integrated agricultural and industrial economy,
in which the government promotes infrastructure development (canals and
roads, at that time) aiding in the growth and prosperity of the populace,
speeds technological growth and improves national security.39 This economic perspective inspired adherents throughout the nation, but nowhere
more than in Hamilton’s home state, New York, where the role of government in improving the “public good” was fully enshrined even at the beginning of the nineteenth century.40
In New York State, a massive expansion of the breadth and use of eminent domain powers for projects such as the Erie Canal and subsequent infrastructure projects was justified based upon the potential public benefits
such projects were expected to provide.41 Specific changes such as an alteration in the judicial definition of the term public use (as applied from the
Fifth Amendment) were introduced, with the term being “narrowly con-

34. Heyward v. New York, 7 N.Y. 314 (1852).
35. See GERARD KOEPPEL, BOND OF UNION: BUILDING THE ERIE CANAL AND AMERICAN
EMPIRE 3 (2009).
36. Governor Dewitt Clinton, the driving force behind the Erie Canal, was a Democratic
Republican.
37. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 303 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966), available at http://www.
constitution.org/ah/rpt_manufactures.pdf.
38. See AMBROSE & MARTIN, supra note 17, at 192.
39. See generally Hamilton, supra note 37.
40. KNOTT, supra note 18, at 43, 54, 56, 83, 108.
41. Green, supra note 10, at 1172-73 (citing Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 341-42
(N.Y. Ch. 1823)).
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strued before the canal, [but] after the canal . . . construed broadly.”42 The
preeminence of economic development interests was continued at the expense of individual property interests in the remedies available for a wrongful taking as well, as “even when construction companies took property
without a state or court order for use in the canal’s construction, they were
required to pay damages rather than return the property.”43
The phrase “Empire State” came into general usage as a nickname for
New York upon the completion of the Erie Canal.44 The completion of that
waterway provided the first direct waterborne link between the Hudson
River at Albany and the Port of New York, and the rich agricultural regions
of western New York and the Great Lakes. This made the state the ideal
conduit for trade between east and west, and thus the keystone of a North
American “empire.”45 As time went on and the U.S. economy shifted from
overwhelmingly agricultural to largely industrial, this transport corridor,
augmented by the New York Central Railroad and, later, the New York
State Thruway, fed economic development in upstate New York and the
Midwest, carrying steel, coal, and the finished products of heavy industry.
The change in economic focus did not, however, change New York State’s
means of promoting it, and the dirigiste philosophy that had supported the
growth of trade in agriculture simply was adapted to industry.46
The prototypical twentieth century dirigiste administrator was New
York’s Robert Moses, the eternal proponent of government-directed infrastructure development.47 Coming to prominence in the 1920s and 1930s,
Moses believed adamantly in his vision of the form economic development
in New York City and other parts of the state should take, and he used government taking power to shape the outcomes of that vision.48 In place of
the piecemeal development of small businesses and houses in neighborhoods like the South Bronx, Moses advocated for and imperiously achieved
the creation of a centrally planned network of highways and bridges. This,

42. Id. at 1171 (citing Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823)).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1167.
45. Id. at 1169.
46. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). In this
staple of first-year property and torts classes, the Court of Appeals refused to grant the traditional remedy of injunction against a cement plant that emitted dust and noise to the detriment of neighbors. Instead, it awarded permanent damages on the grounds that the defendant’s investment in the plant and the number of its employees made that use more valuable.
47. See Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political
Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2019 (2007).
48. ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 4-9 (1974) (magisterial biography of Moses).
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in his view, enhanced overall economic development and the “public
good.”49
The “public private hybrid” development model was chiefly Moses’ invention.50 He used the Tri-Borough Bridge Authority, which had illdefined powers, to help direct massive amounts of government money into
the projects which he supported, essentially turning him into the man with
control of the money to finance infrastructure improvements, which no other person or authority in the state had.51 Moses’ displacement of many
people and businesses and his brusque personal style resulted in vehement
protests and eventually caused the city government to turn against him.52
Despite Moses’ fall, the mindset in favor of large-scale development
through eminent domain takings, against the wishes of property owners and
masterminded by quasi-public organizations, remained undisturbed. A
classic case illustrating this mindset is the ill-fated World Trade Center
Project, which had its genesis in concerns after the Second World War
about New York City retaining its financial leadership in a world of globalized commerce.53 The movers behind the project were New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller and his brother, Chase Manhattan Bank Chairman David Rockefeller. The Port of New York Authority was brought in
because it possessed bonding power, “mean[ing] that Rockefeller did not
have to carry the enormous cost of the project on his state budget.”54 Also,
the Port Authority had the power of eminent domain, which was exercised
against a neighborhood of small shop owners, and which was upheld by the
Court of Appeals in the highly publicized case of Courtesy Sandwich Shop,
Inc. v. Port of New York Authority.55 Dirigisme in New York remains alive
and well today, as demonstrated by the Atlantic Yards Project56 and similar

49. Id. at 850.
50. Nasim Farjad, Condemnation Friendly or Land Use Wise? A Broad Interpretation of
the Public Use Requirement Works Well for New York City, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1121,
1155 (2007) (quoting Eleanor Randolph, Editorial, Robert Moses, Builder, Left Behind His
Power Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at A26).
51. CARO, supra note 48, at 386-92, 617-18.
52. See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
(1961). Jacobs herself had been radicalized by Moses’ plan to run a highway through
Washington Square Park. Id.
53. See Mary L. Clark, Lessons From the World Trade Center for Open Space Planning
Generally and Boston’s Big Dig Specifically, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 301, 301-02
(2005).
54. PAUL GOLDBERGER, UP FROM ZERO: POLITICS, ARCHITECTURE, AND THE REBUILDING
OF NEW YORK 22 (2004).
55. 190 N.E.2d 402 (N.Y. 1963).
56. See generally Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
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ventures throughout the State, sponsored by its redevelopment agency, the
Empire State Development Corporation.57
Illustrative of this tendency toward centralism in land use and development is the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA),58 which
requires review of “virtually all discretionary acts taken by State agencies
and local governments in New York.”59 SEQRA encompasses not only actions undertaken by government agencies or involving government funding, but also those private projects that require agency approvals.60 The
Act has been interpreted as to require detailed review of the economic impact that a commercial enterprise may have on neighborhood character.61
Thus, the Court of Appeals has held that the “potential acceleration of
the displacement of local residents and businesses is a secondary long-term
effect on population patterns, community goals, and neighborhood character such that [SEQRA] requires these impacts on the environment to be
considered in an environmental analysis.”62 In cases where there is a governmental “larger plan” for development, the cumulative impact of all
other pending proposals must be taken into account in the review of any
particular development application.63
In recent years, upstate New York has fallen on hard economic times,64
and manufacturing in New York City has declined, with corresponding
heavy reliance on the financial and service sectors.65 The relative decline
of New York State is illustrated by census data: the 1960 census resulted in
New York having forty-one representatives in Congress, while Florida had

57. For list and summary, see Major Development Projects, EMPIRE STATE DEV., http://
www.empire.state.ny.us/Subsidiaries_Projects.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
58. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW art. 8 (McKinney 2010).
59. John F. Shea, Environmental Law and Regulation in New York, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REV. 223, 226 (1997).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Soc’y of the Plastics Indus. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y.
1991).
62. Chinese Staff & Workers Ass’n v. City of New York, 502 N.E.2d 176, 180-81 (N.Y.
1986).
63. Long Island Pine Barrens Soc’y, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Brookhaven, 606 N.E.2d
1373, 1378 (N.Y. 1992) (quoting Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, 512 N.E.2d
526, 531 (N.Y. 1987)).
64. State & County QuickFacts: Buffalo (City), New York, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3611000.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011) (showing the decline in population and a median household income almost half that of New York
State as a whole).
65. May 2009 State Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: New York, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (last modified Apr. 6, 2010), http://www.
bls.gov/oes/current/oes_ny.htm (showing the great majority of New York State workers are
no longer employed in industry).
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twelve representatives.66 As a result of the 2010 census, both states have
twenty-seven representatives. California supplanted New York as the most
populous state in the 1970 census, with Texas also surpassing New York’s
population in 1994.67 Florida is expected to supplant New York in 2015 as
the nation’s third most populous state.68 The dirigiste system seems to be
in danger not due to any successful attempts to tame it or do away with it,
but simply due to a shift in the economic needs of the state and a failure to
adjust accordingly.
The declining relative importance of manufacturing in American cities,
together with tremendous growth in the importance of information,69 suggest a change in focus for the State’s dirigiste inclination. While eminent
domain was the lynchpin of the Atlantic Yards project,70 it also was employed to obtain the site for the new headquarters building of an important
information purveyor, the New York Times.71 Given the interlocking of
economic actors and interests, it is perhaps not a coincidence that The New
York Times has been an avid booster of the controversial use of condemnation for Atlantic Yards and Columbia University.72

66. KAREN MILLS, U.S.
MENT, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 2

CENSUS BUREAU, C2KBR/01-7, CONGRESSIONAL APPORTION(2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2k

br01-7.pdf.
67. The 2011 Statistical Abstract: The National Data Book, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:
//www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/population.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
68. PAUL R. CAMPBELL, POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PPL-47, POPULATION
PROJECTIONS FOR STATES BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1995 TO 2025 (1996),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/ppl47.html.
69. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
70. See infra Part II.C.
71. See Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference
to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards Project, 42 URB. LAW.
287, 369 (2010).
72. See id. (noting that The New York Times Company partnered on its midtown headquarters building with Forest City Ratner, the developer of Atlantic Yards). The New York
Times coverage, in turn, was not critical of the Atlantic Yards Project. Id. The New York
Times also editorialized that the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the use of eminent
domain for Atlantic Yards in Goldstein was the “right decision,” and that the Appellate Division’s opinion in Kaur, finding the Manhattanville Project advocated by Columbia University to be pretextual was “misguided[]” and “weakly reasoned.” See Editorial, Eminent
Domain in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A30. Most recently, a New York Times
architectural review has lavished praise on the new Columbia science building that will
serve as the gateway to the campus extension that was the subject of Kaur as “superb architecture” and a means of “reinforcing the university’s public mission.” Nicolai Ouroussoff, A
Building Forms a Bridge Between a University’s Past and Future, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2011, at C2.
It is also, not incidentally, a work of healing. Seen in the context of Columbia’s
often tense relationship with its Harlem neighbors, including recent battles over its
plans to build a new 17-acre campus in West Harlem, the building is a gleaming
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The mindset that first flowered in the governance structure for Columbia
College soon after Independence may have reached its culmination in the
partnership between the State and what is now Columbia University. In
2010, the New York Court of Appeals endorsed, without effective qualification, that the State’s imprimatur permits it to appropriate parcels belonging to its neighbors and then re-convey them to Columbia.73
In a statement released shortly after his recent swearing-in as governor,
Andrew M. Cuomo pledged to serve the people of New York “and make it
the Empire State once again.”74 That promise hints that the State’s interventions in the economy will continue and perhaps grow. If so, reconciling
the State’s role in urban revitalization with transparency, the prevention of
crony capitalism, and private property rights will become more important
than ever. It is incumbent upon the New York Court of Appeals to make
its review of litigation arising from this process more conceptually sound
and practically astute.
II. TAKINGS AND PUBLIC USE LAW
A.

Takings Law

The right of the State to take private property for public use is an
attribute of sovereignty that does not depend on any constitutional provision.75 The U.S. Constitution says, “nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”76 The U.S. Supreme Court described the Takings Clause as a “tacit recognition of a pre-existing power
to take private property for public use, rather than a grant of a new power.”77 The corresponding New York provision is in substance exactly the
same: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”78
physical expression of the university’s desire to bridge the divide between the insular world of the campus and the community beyond its walls.
Id.
73. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub
nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
74. Danny Hakim, Cuomo is Sworn In as New York’s Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
2010, at A13.
75. Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587 (1923); Heyward v.
New York, 7 N.Y. 314, 325 (1852); see also Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. v. City of New
York, 183 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1962) (noting that the power of eminent domain antedates the
state and federal Constitutions, survived their adoption, and is subject only to restrictions
that takings shall be for authorized public use and that just compensation be paid to owners).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946).
78. N.Y. CONST. § 7(a).
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The exigencies of government do not permit uncompensated takings,
even if government has great need. Justice Holmes warned in the seminal
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that “[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”79 Likewise, the New York Court of
Appeals warned that “no matter how pressing a problem may be, private
property may not be so interfered with as to amount to taking without compensation even for public purpose or to advance general welfare.”80 Other
cases reinforced this admonition.81 Within these constraints, however, the
New York Court of Appeals has stated that the power of eminent domain is
legislative, and it is the legislature that determines the necessity for and
time and manner of its exercise.82
In 1835, the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York, the State’s highest court of law at that time, held in the case of In re Albany Street83 that a
statute authorizing the condemnation of an entire lot was invalid when only
part of the land was required for the establishment of a street and the landowner did not consent.
If this provision . . . is to be taken literally, that the commissioners may,
against the consent of the owner, take the whole lot, when only a part is
required for public use, and the residue to be applied to private use, it assumes a power which, with all respect, the legislature did not possess.
The Constitution, by authorizing the appropriation of private property to
public use, impliedly declares, that for any other use, private property
shall not be taken from one and applied to the use of another. It is in violation of natural right, and if it is not in violation of the letter of the Constitution, it is of its spirit, and cannot be supported.84

In another possible reflection of John Locke’s famous declaration “their
lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name property,”85
the Supreme Court of Judicature declared in 1843, in Taylor v. Porter &
Ford:86

79. 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
80. Salamar Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 275 N.E.2d 585, 588 (N.Y. 1971).
81. See, e.g., In re Cheesebrough, 78 N.Y. 232 (1879) (holding that, despite the State’s
interest in the health of its citizens, a permanent sewer could not be installed on private land
without payment of just compensation).
82. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp. v. Johnson, 154 N.E.2d 550, 555 (N.Y. 1958).
83. 11 Wend. 149, 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
84. Id. at 151.
85. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 155 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
86. 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
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It will be seen that the same measure of protection against legislative encroachment is extended to life, liberty and property; and if the latter can
be taken without a forensic trial and judgment, there is no security for the
others. If the legislature can take the property of A and transfer it to B,
they can take A himself, and either shut him up in prison, or put him to
death. But none of these things can be done by mere legislation. There
must be “due process of law.”87

During the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court at first required
compensation only where the state divested the landowner of title,88 but
subsequently extended the concept to instances where governmental actions worked a permanent appropriation.89 However, it drew the line at
cases where the regulation was an application of the police power, designed
to prevent harm.90 Likewise, New York courts have recognized that reasonable land use restrictions imposed under the police power do not constitute takings merely because the land’s value is substantially reduced.91
In 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,92 the U.S. Supreme Court
held for the first time that regulation of property use, as well as physical
appropriation, could require just compensation under the Takings Clause, if
the regulation went “too far.”93 Pennsylvania Coal remains “the foundation” of regulatory takings law,94 and its’ “too far” language has been
adopted in New York.95
The most general test employed by the Supreme Court in determining
whether a regulatory taking has occurred is contained in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.96 That case, decided in 1978, provided for an ad hoc, multi-factor balancing test. Penn Central remains the

87. Id. at 147.
88. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57 (1999).
89. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871) (land above government dam permanently inundated).
90. See, e.g., Mulger v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (loss of value in brewery building
after prohibition imposed).
91. Putnam Cnty. Nat’l Bank v. City of New York, 829 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007).
92. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See generally STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 77(b)(1) (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS].
93. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
94. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 508 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (the case was decided by a 5-4 vote).
95. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Vill. of Fairport, 446 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982) (“If the regulation goes too far, the municipality’s action will be treated as a public
taking for which compensation is required.”).
96. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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“polestar” of the Court’s takings jurisprudence.97 Not subjected to Penn
Central balancing are “categorical” takings, in which land is deprived of all
economic use,98 or instances of permanent physical occupation, however
slight.99 The Court reiterated and summarized these rules in 2005, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.100
In New York, the principal Court of Appeals’ application of Penn Central has been a quartet of cases decided in 1997: Basile v. Town of Southampton,101 Kim v. City of New York,102 Gazza v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation,103 and Anello v. Zoning Board of
Appeals of the Village of Dobbs Ferry.104 “Viewed as a whole, this ‘takings quartet’ makes it significantly easier for the State of New York and its
subdivisions to resist the takings claims of private landowners.”105
In Anello, the Court of Appeals held that the challenge to a permit denial
occasioned by a “steep slope” ordinance “must fail,” since the “restriction
thus encumbered petitioner’s title from the outset of her ownership and its
enforcement does not constitute a governmental taking of any property interest owned by her.”106 In Gazza, a development variance required by a
wetlands ordinance antecedent to the plaintiff’s purchase was denied.107
The Court of Appeals declared that “[t]he relevant property interests owned
by the petitioner are defined by those State laws enacted and in effect at the
time he took title.”108 Alternatively, petitioner’s “reasonable expectations”
at the time of his purchase “were not affected when the property remained
restricted” and that “the alleged diminution of value and limitation of property uses caused by the environmental regulations would fall well within
constitutional boundaries.”109
In Basile, tidal lands were subject both to wetlands regulations and to a
covenant whereby plaintiff’s predecessor in title recited that the parcel
“may consist of wetlands and may not be suitable for erection of a dwel97. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
98. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
99. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
100. 544 U.S. 528, 536-40 (2005).
101. 678 N.E.2d 489 (N.Y. 1997).
102. 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997).
103. 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997).
104. 678 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1997).
105. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet, supra note 33, at 346.
106. Anello, 678 N.E.2d at 871 (stating that a “steep slope” ordinance prevented petitioner from building a one-family dwelling on a parcel in order to promote the orderly development of land with excessively steep slope areas).
107. Gazza, 679 N.E.2d at 1040.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1043.
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ling,” and no building shall be erected “unless and until” the parcel is “approved as a building lot” by the Town.110 The Court of Appeals noted that
“‘[t]he wetlands regulations at issue in this case did not deprive claimant of
any interest in the property that had not already been encumbered’ by virtue of the covenants.”111 Finally, in Kim, owners of a gas station claimed a
physical taking by dint of city construction of a high earthen wall filling
some of their parcel and blocking access to some of the rest. The court decided that they were put on notice of a change in the adjoining avenue’s
grade by a map filed in the county engineer’s office a decade before, and
that the city’s actions saved them the cost of a similar structure to provide
the avenue with the required lateral support.112
More recently, in Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State,113 the Court of
Appeals summarized its regulatory takings jurisprudence, borrowing heavily from the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc.114 “Governmental regulation of private property,” it said, “effects a
taking if it is ‘so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.’”115 “To determine whether a regulation is proper or goes
‘too far,’ a court must consider the factors identified in Penn Central. The
primary, but not exclusive Penn Central inquiry turns on ‘the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’”116
B.

Public Use

In Kelo v. City of New London,117 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld, as
consistent with the Public Use Clause,118 the condemnation of sound residences for retransfer for private urban revitalization. In explaining the
Court’s holding, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion was careful to adumbrate that “it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the
property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party
B, even though A is paid just compensation.”119 “A purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would
110. Basile v. Town of Southampton, 678 N.E.2d 489, 490 (N.Y. 1997).
111. Id. at 491 (internal citation omitted).
112. Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 313-15 (N.Y. 1997).
113. 840 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 2005).
114. 544 U.S. 528, 536-40 (2005).
115. 840 N.E.2d at 84 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537).
116. Id. at 84-85 (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539).
117. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
119. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
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serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.”120
The Public Use Clause has its genesis in substantive due process, which
permeates the Court’s early discussion in Calder v. Bull:
[A] law that takes property from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers;
and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius,
the nature, and the spirit, of our State Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them.121

Similarly, the New York Supreme Court stated, “[t]he people cannot, as
long as the Constitutions of the state of New York and of the United States
remain in their present form, take private property for use of other than the
people, even if they pay just compensation.”122
In Taylor v. Porter & Ford,123 although the plaintiff succeeded in preventing a road from crossing his property without permission, the judge
opined that “the legislature is not supreme,” and could not “transfer the
property of A to B.”124
I shall not be understood as saying that a trial and judgment are necessary
in exercising the right of eminent domain. When private property is taken
for public use, the only restriction is, that just compensation shall be made
to the owner. But when one man wants the property of another, I mean to
say that the legislature cannot aid him in making the acquisition.125

Other than “law and reason,” two factors militate against condemnation
of property from private party A solely for the benefit of private party B.
The first is injury to A, who loses the subjective value he or she places on
ownership above fair market value. Since it is impractical to pay condemnees their asserted subjective value of their land, the Supreme Court has
decided that payment of fair market value is the measure of “just compensation.”126 The sentimental value of a family long residing in a house and
the goodwill and customization of premises used by business are familiar
examples of uncompensated losses, since “market value is not the value
that every owner of property attaches to his property but merely the value
that the marginal owner attaches to his property.”127 That subjective value

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 279 N.Y.S. 299, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935).
4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970).
Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
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represents a real loss to owners, however, as does the uncompensated costs
in time and money expended in searching for substitute premises and moving. For these reasons, “[c]ompensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full compensation.”128 A separate reason for disallowing condemnations producing purely private benefit is the inevitable corruption and
undermining of the fabric of a democratic society that would result.129
At least as early as 1837, New York’s highest court ruled that private
parties could derive incidental benefit from the exercise of eminent domain,130 a point made explicitly in its 1878 case of In re Ryers.131 New
York has long given great discretion to legislative decisions. In 1835, in
Varick v. Smith,132 the Chancery Court of New York noted the primacy of
the legislature in deciding what constituted a public purpose. In connection
with the disposition of waters from a dam constructed to facilitate a state
canal, it stated “the legislature is the sole judge as to the expediency of
making police regulations, interfering with the natural rights of the citizens
of the state; and as to the expediency of exercising the right of eminent
domain, for any public purposes.”133 A 1914 Court of Appeals case held
that it is not objectionable that a grant of the right of eminent domain originated in and was designed to subserve private interests, so long as the use is
public.134
Adopting a broad construction of the term “public use,” the New York
Court of Appeals held, in Denihan Industries v. O’Dwyer,135 that “an incidental private benefit, such as a reasonable proportion of commercial
space, is not enough to invalidate a project which has for its primary object
a public purpose.”136
In defining permissible “public use,” the Supreme Court’s Kelo opinion
stated the two conflicting views of the subject. The narrow view defined
“public use” as “use by the public,” which meant use by the general public,

128. Id.
129. See Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 78-79 (2002) (noting the relationship
between property and liberty).
130. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (1837) (upholding delegation of
eminent domain power to railroads with incidental benefit to them).
131. 72 N.Y. 1, 7-8 (1878).
132. 5 Paige Ch. 137 (N.Y. Ch. 1835).
133. Id. at 137.
134. Oneonta Light & Power Co. v. Schwarzenbach, 150 N.Y.S. 76, 81 (N.Y. App. Div.
1914), aff’d, 114 N.E. 1075 (N.Y. 1916).
135. 99 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y. 1951).
136. Id. at 238.
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government agencies, and common carriers that were heavily regulated and
obligated to serve the public.137
[W]hile many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed “use by the
public” as the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily
eroded over time. Not only was the “use by the public” test difficult to
administer (e.g., what proportion of the public need have access to the
property? at what price?), but it proved to be impractical given the diverse
and always evolving needs of society.138

Instead, Justice Stevens stated, “when this Court began applying the
Fifth Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced
the broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”139
Justice Stevens recognized that the broad “public purpose” test he propounded was susceptible to abuse. Situations where a “private purpose was
afoot” could be “confronted if and when they arise. They do not warrant
the crafting of an artificial restriction on the concept of public use.”140
In the Court of Appeals’ recent decisions in Goldstein v. New York State
Urban Development Corp.,141 and Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,142 the possibility of abuse indeed has arisen. That problem
is exacerbated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s hazy jurisprudence of “pretextuality,” and by daunting procedural impediments to ascertaining whether
that condition exists.
C.

Maximum Deference in Goldstein and Kaur

The principal New York public use case decided since the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Kelo decision143 was Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.144 There, the Court of Appeals upheld the condemnation of
private parcels to facilitate construction of Atlantic Yards, a 22-acre mixeduse development in downtown Brooklyn proposed by private developer
Bruce Ratner.145 According to the court’s summary:

137. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 480.
140. Id. at 487 (internal citations omitted).
141. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
142. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
143. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
144. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
145. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 71, at 288 (providing detailed account of the politics,
social dynamics, and economics of the Atlantic Yards project).
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The project is to involve, in its first phase, construction of a sports arena
to house the NBA Nets franchise, as well as various infrastructure improvements—most notably reconfiguration and modernization of the
Vanderbilt Yards rail facilities and access upgrades to the subway transportation hub already present at the site. The project will also involve
construction of a platform spanning the rail yards and connecting portions
of the neighborhood now separated by the rail cut. Atop this platform are
to be situated, in a second phase of construction, numerous high rise
buildings and some eight acres of open, publicly accessible landscaped
space. The 16 towers planned for the project will serve both commercial
and residential purposes. They are slated to contain between 5,325 and
6,430 dwelling units, more than a third of which are to be affordable either for low and/or middle income families.146

The project was challenged on the grounds that the Atlantic Yards
project was intended to facilitate private economic gain, albeit with possible incidental public benefit.147 The Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the alleged blight in the project area “did not begin to approach in severity
the dire circumstances of urban slum dwelling” present in New York City
Housing Authority v. Muller,148 the 1936 case in which it first recognized
blight as grounds for condemnation.149 Nevertheless, it stated that subsequent cases upheld blight condemnations where “a substantial part of the
area” was “‘substandard and insanitary’ by modern tests.”150
“Gradually, as the complexities of urban conditions became better understood, it has become clear that the areas eligible for such renewal are not
limited to ‘slums’ as that term was formerly applied, and that, among other things, economic underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to
the public sufficient to make their removal cognizable as a public purpose.”151

The court stressed that “lending precise content” to general terms such
as “blight” “has not been, and may not be, primarily a judicial exercise,”
and that the Legislature had left the “actual specification” of public uses
146. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166.
147. Id. at 170.
148. 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
Enormous economic loss results directly from the necessary expenditure of public
funds to maintain health and hospital services for afflicted slum dwellers and to
war against crime and immorality. Indirectly there is an equally heavy capital loss
and a diminishing return in taxes because of the areas blighted by the existence of
the slums.
Id. at 154.
149. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 171.
150. Id. (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1953)).
151. Id. at 172 (quoting Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y.
1975)).
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“largely . . . to quasi-legislative administrative agencies.”152 “It is only
where there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether
an area is blighted, that judges may substitute their views as to the adequacy with which the public purpose of blight removal has been made out for
those of the legislatively designated agencies . . . .”153
Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion challenged both the “self-serving” determination by the State redevelopment agency that petitioners lived in a
“blighted” neighborhood and the majority’s deference to that finding.154
The legal implications of the majority opinion and dissent in Goldstein are
analyzed elsewhere in the Article.155
Soon after Goldstein was decided, the Appellate Division held, in Kaur
v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,156 that condemnation by the
Empire State Development Corporation for the purpose of extending the
Columbia University campus in West Harlem did violate the public use requirement. While Goldstein primarily discussed the extent to which urban
disamenities constituted “blight” under New York law, the Appellate Division in Kaur described the blight designation as “mere sophistry”157 and
approached the case primarily in the context of pretext.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ESDC’s “findings of blight
and determination that the condemnation of petitioners’ property qualified
as a ‘land use improvement project’ were rationally based and entitled to
deference.”158 The court noted that in Goldstein it had “reaffirmed the
long-standing doctrine that the role of the Judiciary is limited in reviewing
findings of blight in eminent domain proceedings.”159 It restated the “objective data utilized by ESDC,” and that, given the Court of Appeals
precedent, the Appellate Division’s de novo review of the record was “improper.”160
It concluded that, “[o]n the ‘record upon which the ESDC determination
was based and by which we are bound’ it cannot be said that ESDC’s finding of blight was irrational or baseless.”161

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 186 (Smith, J., dissenting).
155. See infra Part III.C.
156. 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert.
denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
157. Id. at 10.
158. 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010).
159. Id. at 730.
160. Id. at 731.
161. Id. (quoting Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 166 (N.Y.
2009)) (citing Levine v. New York State Liquor Auth., 245 N.E.2d 804 (N.Y. 1969)).
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The Appellate Division also had held that the alternative basis upon
which the Manhattanville Project could be upheld, that it was a “civic
project,” could not be met because the expansion was of a private university.162 The Court of Appeals rejected this distinction as lacking statutory
support,163 adding that “the advancement of higher education is the quintessential example of a ‘civic purpose.’”164
III. VITIATION OF PUBLIC USE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
At its outset, this Article postulated that the combination of Kelo and
Kaur is worse than a crime; it is a blunder. The present section explores
the “crime” itself and why the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kelo v.
City of New London,165 as brought to fruition in Kaur v. New York State
Urban Development Corp.,166 effectively reads the Public Use Clause out
of the United States and New York State Constitutions.167 The subsequent
section discusses why this development constitutes a blunder from a public
policy perspective.168
A.

Kelo Demonstrates the Need for a Limiting Principle

In Kelo,169 the Supreme Court found that the condemnation of a sound
moderate- and middle-income residential neighborhood for retransfer for
private urban revitalization, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Public
Use Clause. The Court specifically rejected the “narrow” interpretation of
public use, which limits eminent domain to instances of intended use by the
general public, a government agency, or a highly regulated common carrier
obligated to serve the public.170 Instead, it adopted a “broad” view that
equates “public use” with “public purpose.”171
The problem with the broad view is that “public purpose” is an indeterminate term. Justice O’Connor, who wrote the principal opinion for the

162. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
163. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 733-34 (N.Y. 2010).
164. Id. at 734.
165. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
166. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”); N.Y. CONST. § 7(a) (“Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.”).
168. See infra Part IV.
169. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
170. Id. at 479.
171. Id. at 479-80. See also supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.

EAGLE_CHRISTENSEN

2011]

6/7/2011 7:01 PM

PUBLIC USE IN THE DIRIGISTE TRADITION

1045

four dissenters,172 earlier had stated in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff173 that “[t]he ‘public use’ requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope
of a sovereign’s police powers.”174 In Kelo, she drew back from the
sweeping implications of that formulation and from Justice Douglas’ similar earlier proclamation in Berman v. Parker that “[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the
means to the end.”175 Justice O’Connor distinguished those cases, noting
that the “extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property inflicted affirmative harm on society.”176 She explained that the government
responded to a blighted neighborhood that was injurious to health in Berman, and to a dramatic concentration of land ownership in Midkiff.177 “Because each taking directly achieved a public benefit, it did not matter that
the property was turned over to private use.”178 In Kelo, however, the city
never claimed that the petitioners’ “well-maintained homes are the source
of any social harm.”179
B.

The Unsatisfactory Adoption of Pretextuality

The Supreme Court’s Kelo analysis began by juxtaposing two “polar
propositions.”180 While the State “may not take the property of A for the
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is
paid just compensation,” it “may transfer property from one private party to
another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking.”181
As a corollary to this proposition, the State cannot “take property under
the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow
a private benefit.”182 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo added
that “[a] court applying rational basis review under the Public Use Clause
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a

172. Id. at 494-505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas).
173. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
174. Id. at 240.
175. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
176. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 498-99.
178. Id. at 500.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 477.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 478.
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particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”183
Kelo is the first case in which the Supreme Court has endorsed the “notion of a ‘pretext’ claim.”184 Why did the Court adopt a standard based on
intent, and is that standard workable?
1.

Why Should Motive Matter?

“Pretextuality” refers to the proffer of an ostensible motive for conduct
in order to hide the speaker’s actual motive. There are many areas in which
motive is important. The criminal law, which focuses on punishment, naturally is concerned with moral culpability. “The late Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes once pointed out the distinction between criminal and non-criminal
intent: ‘Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked.’”185 On the other hand, injury to property is the purview of the law
of tort, where rectification and indemnification is the focus and not punishment of the party causing the harm. This point was well articulated in
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Kelo:
Even if there were a practical way to isolate the motives behind a given
taking, the gesture toward a purpose test is theoretically flawed. If it is
true that incidental public benefits from new private use are enough to ensure the “public purpose” in a taking, why should it matter, as far as the
Fifth Amendment is concerned, what inspired the taking in the first place?
How much the government does or does not desire to benefit a favored
private party has no bearing on whether an economic development taking
will or will not generate secondary benefit for the public. And whatever
the reason for a given condemnation, the effect is the same from the constitutional perspective—private property is forcibly relinquished to new
private ownership.186

Justice O’Connor was correct, but the anomaly she describes was one
she was complicit in establishing. It was she who declared, “[o]ur polestar
. . . remains the principles set forth in Penn Central,” the case wherein the
Court substituted its ad hoc, multifactor test for regulations187 based heavily on expectations.188 Justice Stevens quoted her concurring opinion and
its “polestar” formulation as persuasive to the Court that even the complete
183. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
184. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir. 2008).
185. United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Morisette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 n.9 (1952)).
186. Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 502-03 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
187. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
188. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment Backed Expectations,”
32 URB. LAW. 437, 439 (2000).
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deprivation of all economic use for a substantial period of time should be
judged under the flexible Penn Central formulation instead of under the
Lucas standard.189 At its heart, Penn Central is not a takings test; it is a
due process test.190 Due process concerns proportionality (ends-means
analysis) and fairness.191
In Armstrong v. United States,192 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the
Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”193 Penn Central quoted this language and
immediately added that “this Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”194 Subsequently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,195 the Court referred to this dictum as the
“Armstrong principle.”196
When the government condemns or physically appropriates the property,
the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed. When, however,
the owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or
appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more complex.197

Tahoe-Sierra thus stated that the subtlety of analysis required to discern
whether regulations are so severe that fairness requires just compensation
makes categorical rules unsuitable and directs us back to the ad hoc, multifactor analysis of Penn Central. There, the Court found that “factors that
have particular significance” are the “economic impact of the regulation on

189. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
336-38 (2002).
190. See Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1016-21 (2000); see also John D. Echeverria, The Takings
Issue and the Due Process Clause, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 696 (1993) (“[I]n the course of developing the Takings Clause as a substantive constraint on property regulation, the Court, in
ad hoc fashion, has incorporated into its takings analysis standards the Court formerly utilized exclusively in its review of regulatory activities under the Due Process Clause.”).
191. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981)
(due process “expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness’”).
192. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
193. Id. at 49.
194. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
195. 535 U.S. 302 (1902).
196. Id. at 321.
197. Id. at 322 n.17.
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the claimant,” whether it interferes with “distinct investment-backed expectations,” and the “character of the governmental action.”198
There are distinct advantages in the alternative of examining objective
intent. In Goldstein v. Pataki,199 for instance, the Second Circuit quoted an
observation in a dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia that “discerning the
subjective motivation of [a legislative body] is, to be honest, almost always
an impossible task. . . . To look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not exist.”200 On the other
hand, the opinion added that Justice Scalia prefaced his remark by noting
that “it is possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the
public good at which its provisions appear to be directed).”201
Perhaps the Supreme Court predicates its public use jurisprudence on intent for the same reason that it predicates its regulatory takings jurisprudence on intent. Examinations of subjective motivation permit the Court to
circumvent the direct questions that it must face under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Did the plaintiff own property? Did the government take the property? Was just compensation paid? The Court could establish bright line rules for deciding these questions, relying, for example,
upon proposed objective standards such as the “independent economic viability” standard for any “horizontally definable parcel,”202 or any set of
property rights selected by the owner, so long as it is recognized as a
“commercial unit” in a recognized market.203
The Court in Penn Central did not define the “character of the regulation” test, but merely illustrated it by observing that “[a] ‘taking’ may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized
as a physical invasion . . . than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.”204 However, four years later, the Court held in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. that a permanent physical invasion
constitutes a categorical taking without regard to the Penn Central balanc-

198. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
199. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
200. Id. at 63 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)) (alteration in original).
201. Id.
202. See John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking
Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (1994) (“[A]ny horizontally definable parcel, containing at least one economically viable use independent of the immediately surrounding
land segments, loses all economic use due to government regulation.”).
203. See EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, supra note 92, § 7-7(e)(5), at 934 (noting that
the term is adopted from U.C.C. § 2-608(1)).
204. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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ing test.205 Thus, the “character of the regulation” test was deprived of its
only clear content. It would seem, however, that unfairness is an aspect of
its meaning.
In American Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States,206 newly enacted
statutes precluded one large, advanced, and specialized fishing ship from
plying its trade, as if that one entry in a large fishing fleet “had been identified by name in the text of the acts.”207 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims
stressed that the new law’s severity, essential retroactivity, and specific targeting justified a finding that there was a regulatory taking under the “character of the regulation” test.208 The Federal Circuit reversed on other
grounds,209 and the point has not been definitively decided. It might be
that, as Professor Mark Fenster put it:
Ultimately, the character factor serves as a judicial escape hatch. . . . A
properly functionalist judge should assess the conflicting human values at
stake in the litigation, appraise the social importance of existing
precedent, consider all of the relevant evidence that would bring light to
the conflict, and reject the use of abstract legal concepts that would direct
the decision away from the particular dispute and the prevalent norms of
social and commercial behavior in the relevant field. . . . To the extent
that the character factor allows a judge to make this consideration explicit,
it will enable her to more candidly decide the issue.210

The Court chose to submit functional takings of property rights not involving physical appropriation to the Penn Central test, in which the owner’s subjective “expectations” predominates,211 except when those turn out
to be objectively unreasonable.212 Its justification for separate bodies of
physical takings and regulatory takings law rests largely on its observation
that the former “usually represent a greater affront to individual property
rights.”213 It is hard to discern from that truism a valid Constitutional dis205. 458 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1982).
206. 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (2001).
207. Id. at 51.
208. Id. at 46.
209. 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding fishing permits are not property).
210. Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 525, 575-76 (2009).
211. See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68, 85 (N.Y. 2005)
(noting that the “primary, but not exclusive Penn Central inquiry turns on ‘the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.’” (internal
citation omitted)).
212. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). Then-Justice Rehnquist gave no explanation for his opinion’s change in terminology from Penn Central’s “distinct investment-backed expectations.”
213. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
324 (2002).
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tinction. Parenthetically, when it came to “just compensation,” the Court
has rejected any attempt to measure subjective value and adopted a fair
market value standard instead.214
Similarly, “pretextuality” makes sense only as a fairness equivalent
sounding in substantive due process. It seems paradoxical that the Supreme Court has eschewed using substantive due process in property rights
deprivations cases,215 while at the same time using light and ineffectual variants of substantive due process as tests for uncompensated takings and
takings not for public use.
2.

The Assumptions Underlying Pretext are Counterfactual

In 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,216 a U.S.
district court found that the justification given for the condemnation, the
fabricated explanation that 99 Cents’ parcel was “blighted,” clearly was not
the actual reason for the city’s act. But, as I elaborate elsewhere,217 there
was no showing that the city condemned 99 Cents’ parcel to enhance private welfare at the expense of public benefit. The parcel was condemned at
the behest of 99 Cents’ competitor Costco, to which it was to be transferred. As the trial court noted, the city viewed Costco as a lynchpin of its
economic development plans, and was “fearful of Costo’s relocation to
another city.”218 As Lancaster’s city attorney later told the Wall Street
Journal, Costco provided ten times the sales tax revenues to the city that 99
Cents did: “You tell me which was more important.”219
Just as cultivated inscrutability might mask virtue as well as vice, pretextuality might mask an agent’s desire to achieve public benefit. It might be
argued, correctly, that 99 Cents Only Stores would have been the “victim”
of Costco’s apparent scheme to use extortion against the city to oust its
competitor. 99 Cents Only Stores might have had a meritorious tort claim
against Costco for interference with relational interests.220

214. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1945).
215. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). See generally Steven
J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007
BYU L. REV. 899 [hereinafter Eagle, Property Tests].
216. 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed as moot, 60 F. App’x 123 (9th
Cir. 2003).
217. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth, and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 63, 104-05 (2009).
218. 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
219. Dean Starkman, More Courts Rule Cities Misapply Eminent Domain, WALL ST. J.,
July 23, 2001, at B1 (quoting David McEwan).
220. See generally Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1935).
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Thus, although pretextuality might have been an element in the city abetting Costco’s wrongful scheme, it would not indicate that the city had an
underlying wrongful purpose. One could argue that pretextuality in Kelo
was shorthand for “pretextuality for bad purpose.” Akin to the Catholic
theological concept of “double effect,”221 the premise would be that the
government action in cases like 99 Cents Only Stores should be regarded as
privileged because of the legitimacy of its dominant purpose.
The broader point, however, is that courts rightly should be concerned
when private actors have the opportunity to leverage eminent domain to the
disadvantage of competitors and other possible victims of what might rise
to legalized extortion. In 99 Cents Only Stores, an exaction could be had
from only the landowner whose property was taken.222 In Didden v. Village of Port Chester, however, the redeveloper to whom eminent domain
powers had been delegated could exact money from many landowners in
exchange for condemning other parcels in the redevelopment district. 223
3.

The Manichean Distinction Between Public and Private Benefit

Justice Stevens began his analysis in Kelo by stating that government
may not condemn land belonging to A for the “sole purpose” of benefitting
B,224 and that a “purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of
the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.”225 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
declares that “transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored
private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are
forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”226
Official acts that public officials perform to benefit themselves, their
family, and those who bribe them are punishable by criminal law.227 State
actions executing the scheme are arbitrary and capricious and hence run
afoul of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-

221. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 130 (1972)
(describing the “double effect” as a doctrine which distinguishes between bringing something about deliberately and bringing something about as a side effect of a deliberate act).
222. 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
223. 173 F. App’x 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2006).
224. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
225. Id. (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)).
226. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469, 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
227. See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984) (relating history of crime of bribery).
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ments.228 However, every public official knows that private firms enter into the redevelopment process precisely because of the possibility of their
private gain, and that post-contractual attempts to thwart such gain would
give the city the reputation of an unreliable redevelopment partner. In that
sense, a government entity embarking on condemnation for retransfer for
private redevelopment objectively must desire private gain.
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Kelo suggests the Manichean distinction that
gains could be purely public or private. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
suggests that, while there could be both private and public gains, one would
be incidental to the other. Stevens’ assertion seems wrong in theory. Kennedy’s, alas, seems incapable of application.
Citing the eminent Michigan jurist Thomas Cooley, the state’s supreme
court rejected economic revitalization takings in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.229 That case overruled the court’s Poletown doctrine, which countenanced the condemnation of an entire ethnic neighborhood for an auto assembly plant.230
Every business, every productive unit in society, does, as Justice Cooley
noted, contribute in some way to the commonwealth. To justify the exercise of eminent domain solely on the basis of the fact that the use of that
property by a private entity seeking its own profit might contribute to the
economy’s health is to render impotent our constitutional limitations on
the government’s power of eminent domain. Poletown’s “economic benefit” rationale would validate practically any exercise of the power of
eminent domain on behalf of a private entity. After all, if one’s ownership of private property is forever subject to the government’s determination that another private party would put one’s land to better use, then the
ownership of real property is perpetually threatened by the expansion
plans of any large discount retailer, “megastore,” or the like.231

Justice Kennedy’s formulation that “transfers intended to confer benefits
on particular, favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual

228. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584 (1972) (noting
that “the protection of the individual against arbitrary action is the very essence of due
process”) (ellipses, punctuation, and internal citations omitted).
229. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
230. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
231. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786. Perhaps this paragraph was the inspiration for Justice O’Connor’s much more widely quoted lines:
For who among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive
possible use of her property? The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a RitzCarlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

EAGLE_CHRISTENSEN

2011]

PUBLIC USE IN THE DIRIGISTE TRADITION

6/7/2011 7:01 PM

1053

public benefits,”232 does not make clear whether the proscribed intent
would have to encompass incidental public benefits. Either way, “intent”
regarding the future is as ephemeral as Penn Central’s “expectations”
about the future.
Justice Thomas noted that New London’s project, which stated a “vague
promise of new jobs and increased tax revenue,” also was “suspiciously
agreeable to the Pfizer Corporation.”233 But the Fort Trumbull redevelopment undoubtedly contemplated future consequences of its decisions as
well as present ones.
The immediate function of the Fort Trumbull redevelopment was to
build the infrastructure that would be synergetic with Pfizer’s adjoining research center, so that the company would benefit from the restaurants,
shops, hotels, and upscale housing that would provide amenities and lodging for its key personnel and visitors. The redevelopment tenants, in turn,
would benefit from the patronage of Pfizer and its employees and invitees.234
The second purpose of the redevelopment was to serve as a catalyst for
the creation of jobs and needed economic activity in New London and
Connecticut, partly through encouraging other corporations to relocate.
For decisionmaking executives of these companies, the minutiae of Fort
Trumbull negotiations and ensuing contract provisions were hardly relevant. They would be greatly interested in the basic economic terms the city
and state would offer them, to be sure. Beyond that, however, the bottom
line question would be posed to their Pfizer counterparts at business roundtable and trade meetings: “Was New London agreeable to meeting your
needs?” Not only was complying with the informally expressed needs of
Pfizer officials not inimical to the best interest of the city, it affirmatively
furthered the economic development of the city.235
Justice O’Connor’s explanation that “private benefit and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing,” and that
“any boon for Pfizer or the plan’s developer is difficult to disaggregate
from the promised public gains in taxes and jobs” is exactly on point.236

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Practical Objections to Pretextuality

Calder v. Bull described the pure government transfer of property from
A to B as “against all reason and justice.”237 But where the benefits are
“merged and mutually reinforcing,” the principle that government should
not arbitrarily favor one citizen to the detriment of another has to do with
an evaluation of ends and means.
Calder presents a zero-sum game. B now has the property and A does
not. While this sequence of events does not, ex post, affect third parties, it
is clear, ex ante, that society would be a net loser. Property owners like A
would expend time and money attempting to thwart or buy off officials
who might facilitate grabs of their property. Correspondingly, predators
like B would devote their talents and cash to bringing about such untoward
results. As is the case with outright theft, the costs are in both effectuating
and preventing redevelopment transfers, and also, as Professor Frank Michelman described, in the demoralization of rightful owners that would discourage productive investment.238
However, “pretextual” takings involve not actions, but rather variance
between articulated motives and actual motives. Unlike Calder transfers,
pretextual transfers may or may not involve losses to society. They might
well provide benefit to the city engaging in them. Besides, demoralization
costs are present in any exercise of eminent domain.
Assume that Smith is mayor of a small city, and Jones is a developer
who has contributed to Smith’s reelection campaigns. Jones proposes that
the city undertake a redevelopment project that will require condemnation
and will benefit the city in the amount of $20X. Assume that the benefit to
Jones will be $10X. On its face, there is no evidence to suggest that Jones
would have offered a sweeter deal or that the city could have obtained more
than $20X from anyone else. Now, assume instead that, other facts remaining the same, Jones derived $30X in benefit, which is more than the city
did. Further assume that, in the latter case, fear of charges of “pretextuali-

237. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
238. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
“Demoralization costs” are defined as the total of (1) the dollar value necessary to
offset disutilities which accrue to losers and their sympathizers specifically from
the realization that no compensation is offered, and (2) the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or social
unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers,
and other observers disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other occasion.
Id. at 1214 (internal footnote omitted).
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ty” led the city to accept a redevelopment project from Clark instead.
Clark would derive $8X in value, and the city would derive $15X.
Why should the city have to derive $5X less in value by dealing with
Clark, simply to avoid Jones obtaining a greater return than the city? This
analysis suggests that the real problem with pretextuality is not that government is acting for bad motives, but rather that it is acting for opaque motives. Perhaps its actions are for the best, and perhaps they are not. We
just do not know, and that does not seem fair. As a prophylactic measure,
we might want to ban government officials from taking part in nontransparent transactions.239
It might be, as in the case of offenses deemed “hate crimes,” that society
decides to enhance the punishment accorded a wrongful act based on its
motive. The fear of victimization by a criminal motivated by racism, xenophobia, or a similar motive imposes psychological and deterrence costs
upon potential victims in excess of those imposed upon other potential victims of similar crimes. Likewise, uncompensated losses arising from pretextual condemnation might engender a heightened sense of injury in the
condemnee, who would ascribe his injury to predation rather than to the
random chance of government necessity. In the case of “pretextual” condemnation, where such an enhanced level of injury might justify as an appropriate preventative, Justice Kennedy suggested a higher level of judicial
scrutiny in appropriate types of situations.240
C.

Vitiating the Public Use Clause—Goldstein and Kaur

In Marbury v. Madison,241 the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.”242 The Court more recently stated that ‘‘the question [of] what
is a public use is a judicial one.’’243 To the extent the New York Court of
Appeals unduly defers to the political branches of government, it not only
makes it almost impossible for a landowner to win on public use grounds, it
also deprives the Public Use Clause of any independent significance.

239. This was a reason offered by Professor Thomas Merrill as to why cities assemble
parcels through eminent domain rather than adopt “private developers’ ‘guile.’” See Thomas
W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82 (1986); see also infra
notes 395-96 and accompanying text for further discussion.
240. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
241. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
242. Id. at 177.
243. Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930).
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The Court of Appeals Regards “Public Use” as Redundant

The lesson of Goldstein and Kaur is that the New York Court of Appeals
will enforce the Public Use Clause only where it is unnecessary. Through
its vague and open ended definitions of crucial concepts such as “blight”
and “civic purpose,” the court’s jurisprudence implicitly is founded on the
notion that a governmental entity or its chosen redeveloper’s exercise of
eminent domain will be held not to be for public use only under circumstances in which it would lose on independent grounds. In other words,
where other aspects of the taking comport with constitutional and statutory
requirements, public use always would be found. Conversely, where a taking is set aside on public use grounds, it could be set aside for another reason. The result is that the Public Use Clause never is outcome determinative.
2.

An Open-Ended View of “Blight”

The alluring notion of “blight,”244 in its most expansive form, permeates
both Goldstein and Kaur. In Goldstein, Chief Judge Lipmann noted that
the “removal of urban blight” is sanctioned in the court’s 1936 decision in
New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 245 and in the State Constitution, for the alleviation of “substandard and insanitary areas.”246 He added,
though, that by 1975, in Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris,247 urban renewal had progressed from the alleviation of “slums” to
dealing with other “threats to the public sufficient to make their removal
cognizable as a public purpose,” including “economic underdevelopment
and stagnation.”248
In his dissenting opinion in Goldstein, Judge Smith reviewed the court’s
caselaw, including Muller and Morris, and concluded that while these cases
undoubtedly expanded the old understanding of public use, they did not establish the general proposition that property may be condemned and turned
over to a private developer every time a state agency thinks that doing so
would improve the neighborhood.249 The majority provided a half-hearted
defense:
It may be that the bar has now been set too low—that what will now pass
as ‘‘blight,’’ as that expression has come to be understood and used by
244. See infra Part IV.B.
245. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 171 (N.Y. 2009) (citing
N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936)).
246. Id. (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII § 1).
247. 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975).
248. Id. at 330.
249. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 187 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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political appointees to public corporations relying upon studies paid for
by developers, should not be permitted to constitute a predicate for the invasion of property rights and the razing of homes and businesses. But any
such limitation upon the sovereign power of eminent domain as it has
come to be defined in the urban renewal context is a matter for the Legislature, not the courts.250

This admission is remarkable, first, for its passive construction, referring
to the possibility that the standard was “set too low” and how the lack of
constraint “has come to be defined.” More importantly, it seemed to treat
the “sovereign power of eminent domain” as the prerogative of the Legislature, as if the sovereign people had not in their constitution provided for the
judicial department as well as the legislative department.251 The Court of
Appeals’ perspective on blight seems to be a function of the Georgist view
of property ownership and the State’s claims first enunciated by Chief
Judge Breitel.252
3.

Pretext in Goldstein and Kaur

The Court of Appeals’ opinion in Goldstein v. New York Urban Development Corp. did not mention the issue of pretext at all,253 but it was raised
in Judge Smith’s dissent:
According to the petition in this case, when the project was originally announced in 2003 the public benefit claimed for it was economic development—job creation and the bringing of a professional basketball team to
Brooklyn. Petitioners allege that nothing was said about “blight” by the
sponsors of the project until 2005; ESDC has not identified any earlier use
of the term. In 2005, ESDC retained a consultant to conduct a “blight
study.” In light of the special status accorded to blight in the New York
law of eminent domain, the inference that it was a pretext, not the true
motive for this development, seems compelling.254

The majority emphasized that the court was limited in its review to the
record developed by the ESDC,”255 a principle well established in New
York law.256 Given that the controlling record was made by the agency

250. Id. at 172.
251. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
252. See infra Parts IV.A.1-A.2 for further discussion.
253. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
254. Id. at 189 (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 166 (citing In re Levine v. New York State Liquor Auth., 245 N.E.2d 804
(N.Y. 1969)).
256. In re Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 443 N.E.2d 940, 942 (N.Y.
1982) (“A fundamental principle of administrative law long accepted by this court limits
judicial review of an administrative determination solely to the grounds invoked by the
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fostering urban renewal, however, and Judge Smith’s characterization that
the agency’s determination was “self-serving,”257 it is important that it be
considered in that light.
Judge Smith noted that only the northern part of the Atlantic Yards
project area could be described as “blighted,” and that the southern part,
where the plaintiffs lived, appeared to be “a normal and pleasant residential
community.”258 “Choosing their words carefully, the consultants concluded that the area of the proposed Atlantic Yards development, taken as a
whole, was ‘characterized by blighted conditions.’”259 He concluded: “It is
clear to me from the record that the elimination of blight, in the sense of
substandard and unsanitary conditions that present a danger to public safety, was never the bona fide purpose of the development at issue in this
case.”260
For its part, the majority stated facts in the record supporting this determination and noted that when administrative bodies “‘have made their finding, not corruptly or irrationally or baselessly, there is nothing for the
courts to do about it, unless every act and decision of other departments of
government is subject to revision by the courts.’”261
As noted earlier,262 in the aftermath of the New York Court of Appeals
decision in Goldstein,263 the Appellate Division held in Kaur v. New York
State Urban Development Corp. that condemnation by the Empire State
Development Corporation for the purpose of extending the Columbia University campus in West Harlem violated the public use requirement.264 The
Appellate Division described the blight designation in Kaur as “mere sophistry.”265 It stated that the designation “was utilized by ESDC years after
the scheme (i.e., the Manhattanville Project) was hatched to justify the employment of eminent domain, but this project has always primarily concerned a massive capital project for Columbia. Indeed, it is nothing more
agency, and if those grounds are insufficient or improper, the court is powerless to sanction
the determination by substituting what it deems a more appropriate or proper basis.”).
257. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 186 (Smith, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 190 (internal citation omitted).
260. Id. at 189.
261. Id. at 172 (quoting Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.Y.2d 659, 661 (1953)). Judge
Smith pointed out that Kaskel was a taxpayer’s suit, brought under a section of municipal
law requiring corruption, fraud, or a total lack of agency power in order to succeed. Id. at
188 (Smith, J., dissenting).
262. See supra Part II.C.
263. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d 164.
264. 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert.
denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
265. Id. at 10.
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than economic redevelopment wearing a different face.”266 The court
noted that, in his concurring opinion in Kelo, Justice Kennedy “placed particular emphasis on the importance of the underlying planning process . . .
and laid out in detail the elements of the New London plan that ensured
against impermissible favoritism.”267
The Appellate Division stated that the “contrast between ESDC’s
scheme for the redevelopment of Manhattanville and New London’s plan
for Fort Trumbull could not be more dramatic.”268 It enumerated elements
by which the Manhattanville plan diverged from New London’s, including
Master Plan findings that Manhattanville was experiencing a “renaissance
of economic development” prior to the proposed project, that “Columbia
underwrote all of the costs of studying and planning for what would become a sovereign-sponsored campaign of Columbia’s expansion,” and that
the redevelopment agency’s commitment to rezoning Manhattanville was
“not for the goal of general economic development or to remediate an area
that was ‘blighted’ before Columbia acquired over 50% of the property, but
rather solely for the expansion of Columbia itself.”269
The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that ESDC’s “findings of
blight and determination that the condemnation of petitioners’ property
qualified as a ‘land use improvement project’ were rationally based and entitled to deference.”270
D.

Meaningful Scrutiny and Procedural Roadblocks

Promises in Kelo that instances of public use condemnation abuse “can
be confronted if and when they arise,”271 and that “[a] court applying rational basis review . . . should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing,
is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits,”272 are effective only if implemented. As Justice
Kennedy noted in his concurrence, “meaningful rational basis review” requires that courts “conduct[] a careful and extensive inquiry” into primary
and incidental benefits.273 Unfortunately, there is significant tension be-

266. Id.
267. Id. at 12-13 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491-93 (2005)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
268. Id. at 13.
269. Id. at 13-14.
270. Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010).
271. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.
272. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
273. Id. at 491-92.
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tween that goal and the insulation of legislative decisionmaking from overly intrusive judicial review.
1.

Public Use and “Meaningful” Judicial Scrutiny

While Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion as the necessary fifth
vote in Kelo v. City of New London,274 his concurring opinion urged the
adoption of “the meaningful rational basis review that in [his] view is required under the Public Use Clause.”275 He cited favorably to City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,276 a case in which group homes for
the retarded were given less favorable zoning treatment than other multifamily housing, such as hotels and fraternity houses. While purporting to
use rational basis review, the Court actually examined the proffered bases
for the distinction, instead of asserting that the city must have had a plausible basis.277 The case is a leading example of “covert[] heightened scrutiny.”278
Justice Kennedy accepted the premise that eminent domain should be
upheld if “‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.’”279 However, he suggested that this takings standard was parallel to, and not an application of, similar standards developed by the Court in other contexts.280
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a
particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits,
just as a court applying rational-basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause must strike down a government classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular class of private parties, with only incidental
or pretextual public justifications.281

The “clear showing” of favoritism and disproportional private benefit
standard, as Justice Kennedy employed it, seems far less burdensome than
a judicial refusal to find substantive due process applicable to deprivations

274. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
275. Id. at 492 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
276. Id. at 491; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
277. Cleburne, 545 U.S. at 446-47, 450.
278. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1612 (2d ed. 1988);
Eagle, Property Tests, supra note 215, at 951-54 (discussing the Cleburne line of cases).
279. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)).
280. Id. (“This deferential standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to review
economic regulation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.”) (emphasis added).
281. Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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of property at all,282 or application of a “shocks the conscience” standard.283
In order to give the condemnee a chance to make this “clear showing,” a
“court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible favoritism
to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review the
record to see if it has merit, though with the presumption that the government’s actions were reasonable and intended to serve a public purpose.”284
Where there is a “plausible accusation,” then, the first object of judicial inquiry is not to decide if the taking has some legitimate public purpose, but
rather to see if the record indicates pretext or disproportional benefit.
“The record,” for these purposes, should be defined in connection with
Justice Kennedy’s next point.
My agreement with the Court that a presumption of invalidity is not warranted for economic development takings in general, or for the particular
takings at issue in this case, does not foreclose the possibility that a more
stringent standard of review than that announced in Berman and Midkiff
might be appropriate for a more narrowly drawn category of takings.
There may be private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use
Clause.285

The category of takings comprised of transactions where the transferee
(i) initiated the condemnation or was hand-selected by officials ordering
the taking; (ii) would benefit substantially from the taking; and (iii) benefited from a complex and perhaps opaque administrative process, presents
precisely the possibility of “undetected impermissible favoritism” with
which Justice Kennedy was concerned.286
In such a situation, it is not unlikely that officials and their selected redeveloper work together to shape an administrative record that appears unblemished on its face. A court reviewing this record would find ample references to legitimate public purposes and no substantial evidence of
favoritism, disproportionality, or pretext. But, under these circumstances,
that court would not be taking the condemnee’s accusation seriously. That,
in essence, marks the flaws in the New York Court of Appeals review of

282. See Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. City of Mountain Brook, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2003).
283. See Mongeau. v. City of Marlborough, 492 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2007); United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003).
284. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
285. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
286. Id.
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Goldstein and Kaur. In this regard, as in other aspects of the Kelo case,
Justice O’Connor’s reservations seem prescient:
The Court protests that it does not sanction the bare transfer from A to B
for B’s benefit. It suggests two limitations on what can be taken after today’s decision. First, it maintains a role for courts in ferreting out takings
whose sole purpose is to bestow a benefit on the private transferee–
without detailing how courts are to conduct that complicated inquiry. For
his part, Justice Kennedy suggests that courts may divine illicit purpose
by a careful review of the record and the process by which a legislature
arrived at the decision to take–without specifying what courts should look
for in a case with different facts, how they will know if they have found it,
and what to do if they do not. Whatever the details of Justice Kennedy’s
as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the “stupid
staff[er]” failing it.287

If the “Armstrong principle” of fairness288 is the leitmotif of the Takings
Clause, it entails that individuals should not be singled out to bear burdens,
and that the burdens imposed upon them should not be disproportional to
either the burdens imposed on others similarly situated or the burdens that
their actions impose on the community.
Scholars and judges have long considered concepts of fairness and proportionality in connection with takings liability. A classic article by Professor Robert Ellickson discussed the tendency of government to impose
development exactions on landowners lacking political power.289 Similarly, Professor Saul Levmore observed that takings claims are more compelling when the condemnee was singled out as a target of opportunity.290
Meaningful rational basis review, the “more stringent” standard that Justice Kennedy advocated for questionable categories of public use takings,291 requires that rational basis inquiry be conducted with regard to actually proffered justifications for government acts and not conjectural or
plausible ones. This was the standard used in the Cleburne case, to which

287. Id. at 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1025-26 & n.12 (1992)) (additional citations omitted).
288. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). See also supra notes 192-96 and
accompanying text.
289. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 YALE L.J. 385, 439 (1977) (“Development charges . . . are widely used by small suburbs
because they cream off the surplus of a particular group of landowners who have little political power.”).
290. Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306-07
(1990) (contrasting small, isolated property owners in special need of constitutional protection from large, institutional owners, that easily could become involved in the political
process).
291. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy referred, and in similar cases in which there was a possibility of abuse.292
A reminder that “public use” is contextual and not a permanent imprimatur of approval is contained in a case arising from a troubled New York revitalization project, the Destiny USA Mall.293 In Kaufmann’s Carousel,
Inc. v. City of Syracuse Industrial Development Agency,294 a retail store
claimed that easements it owned could not be condemned as part of reconfiguring rights in the project; those easements had been acquired as the result of an earlier condemnation for retransfer.295 Although Kaufmann’s
claimed that the earlier condemnation in its favor certified its use as being a
“public use” that could not subsequently be disturbed, it was unable to convince the court.296
In the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,297 one of the issues before the Court was whether judicial actions could constitute regulatory takings. The Court did not decide the “judicial takings” issue. However, in a part of Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court joined by only Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, Scalia declared that “the
Takings Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying
for it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking. To be sure,
the manner of state action may matter . . . But the particular state actor is
irrelevant.”298 In Dolan v. City of Tigard,299 the Court held that exactions
of property required for development approvals had to be based on “individualized determination” and “rough proportionality” to the burden of the
locality that they imposed.300 But these requirements applied only to administrative determinations, not to legislative exactions.301 To the extent
that subsequent cases adopt Scalia’s view in Stop the Beach that what is
292. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (distribution of Alaska naturalrecourse income according to duration of residency is irrational); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982) (denial of public school to children of illegal immigrants is irrational); see also
Eagle, Property Tests, supra note 215, at 952-54.
293. See, e.g., Rick Moriarty, Syracuse to Decide Deadline for Destiny USA Mall Addition, THE POST-STANDARD, Dec. 19, 2010, available at http://www.syracuse.com/news/
index.ssf/2010/12/syracuse_to_decade_deadline_fo.html.
294. 750 N.Y.S.2d 212, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
295. Id. at 214.
296. Id. at 221.
297. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
298. Id. at 2602.
299. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
300. Id. at 391.
301. See Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1116 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (asserting that there is no relevant difference between administrative and legislative exactions).
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important is that the State act, and not the State actor, the distinction drawn
by Dolan becomes eroded.
2.

Pretext Defenses and Discovery

In Franco v. National Capital Revitalization Corp. (Franco I),302 the
District of Columbia’s redevelopment agency condemned Franco’s store in
the Skyland Shopping Center in the southeast quadrant of the District. The
center contained about thirty stores, and a draft bill introduced in the Council of the District of Columbia called for its condemnation as “necessary
and desirable for the public use.”303 The bill “did not explain why the
properties were ‘necessary’ or to what ‘public use’ they would be devoted.”304 There were no public hearings before the bill was passed, but the
enacted version contained a set of findings of crime and blight, including
underutilization, neglect, poor maintenance, and absentee ownership facilitating the accumulation of trash.305 “The Council also found that ‘[t]he assemblage of the properties comprising the Skyland Shopping Center and
the construction of a new shopping center on the site . . . will further many
important public purposes,’” including alleviation of the factors noted
above.306
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals exercised jurisdiction because the trial court had granted the redevelopment agency immediate possession, and had exercised pendant appellate jurisdiction because the issues
in the dispute were “inextricably intertwined.”307
Proceeding to the merits, the court first noted that Kelo reiterated the
Supreme Court’s “‘longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.’”308 However,
Kelo recognized that there may be situations where a court should not
take at face value what the legislature has said. The government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason, so a property owner must in some circumstances be allowed to allege and to demonstrate
that the stated public purpose for the condemnation is pretextual. It may
be difficult to make this showing, and the Supreme Court’s decision may

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

930 A.2d 160 (D.C. 2007).
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 168 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005)).
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raise many more questions than it answers, but a pretext defense is not
necessarily “foreclosed by Kelo.”309

The court observed that “Justice Kennedy focused hypothetically on the
insubstantial quality of touted public benefits, stating “that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private entities, and with
only incidental or pretextual public benefits, are forbidden by the Public
Use Clause.”310
Franco I noted that it could not “indulge baseless, conclusory allegations
that the legislature acted improperly,”311 but that it “could not summarily
deny without a hearing a property owner’s detailed objections.”312 It held
that “in this case the defense may not be rejected as a matter of pleading,”
vacated the order granting the agency immediate possession, and remanded.313 On remand, the trial court granted broad discovery on Franco’s
takings claim, but deprived him of his substantive pretext defense by applying collateral estoppel based on another Skyway Shopping Center condemnation case.314 The appellate court held, in Franco II, that collateral estoppel was inapplicable.315
Franco II316 also rejected the District’s motion to dismiss the pretext
claim, treating it as a claim for summary judgment, since it involved matters outside the pleadings.317 It observed that “[e]ssentially, Franco was
seeking the same opportunity to complete discovery related to his pretext
claim” that he had enjoyed in his condemnation case “on virtually the same
question, i.e., his pretext defense,” and remanded.318
3.

The Role of Twombly and Iqbal

Pretextuality is more difficult to plead as a result of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,319 and Ashcroft v. Iq309. Id. at 169.
310. Id. at 173.
311. Id. at 171.
312. Id. (citing United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, More or Less, 478 F.2d 1055, 1057,
1059 (7th Cir. 1973)).
313. Id. at 175-76.
314. Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp. (Franco II), 3 A.3d 300, 303 (D.C.
2010).
315. Id. at 305. In a related procedural issue, Franco II held that the landowner was not
collaterally estopped from asserting his pretext defense because a similar defense had not
prevailed in a separate lawsuit filed by another condemnee in the same revitalization project
in which Franco had not participated. Id.
316. Id. at 300.
317. Id. at 307.
318. Id. at 308.
319. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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bal.320 In 1957, in Conley v. Gibson,321 the Supreme Court enunciated “the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”322 As explained in Iqbal, the Court adopted a stricter standard in Twombly, requiring that:
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is
not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint
pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it
“stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement
to relief.’”323

Franco I stated that the Twombly standard had been met.324 However,
Twombly played a substantial, if not fully specified, role in Goldstein v. Pataki.325 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to explore the parameters of the case, since the appellants accepted its applicability and “[a]s all parties acknowledge, at a bare minimum, the operative
standard requires the plaintiff [to] provide the grounds upon which his
claim rests through factual allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.’”326 The Second Circuit concluded that, “[i]n
view of what they have effectively conceded in prosecuting this lawsuit,
the appellants cannot meet this standard.”327
Goldstein v. Pataki considered whether the plaintiffs’ Atlantic Yards
claim sufficiently alleged that the taking of his property by eminent domain
violated the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court stated
that they had effectively acknowledged the project’s public benefits, but
contended that these “serv[ed] as a ‘pretext’ that masks its actual raison
d’être: enriching the private individual who proposed it and stood to profit
320. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
321. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
322. Id. at 45-46.
323. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citations omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-70).
324. Franco I, 930 A.2d at 170 (noting that “Franco made many specific factual allegations to support this claim”).
325. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
326. Id. at 56 (quoting ATSI Commc’ns v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545)).
327. Id. at 56-57.
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most from its completion.”328 It noted as the essence of the plaintiffs’ argument:
Defendants’ decision to take Plaintiffs’ properties serves only one purpose: it allows Ratner to build a Project of unprecedented size, and thus
reap a profit that Defendants, tellingly, have attempted to conceal at every
turn. This is not merely favoritism of a particular developer. . . . Here, the
‘‘favored’’ developer is driving and dictating the process, with government officials at all levels obediently falling into line.329

These claims, the Second Circuit continued, related to the fact that Bruce
Ratner was the impetus behind the Project, that his proffered civic improvements were post hoc justifications, and that the Empire State Development Corporation’s review was a “sham” in which the outcome was long
“predetermined.”330 The court explained that the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ contentions is that benefits objectively related to public use “should
nevertheless be rejected as ‘pretextual,’ not because they are false, but because they are not the real reason for the Project’s approval.”331
The court stated that pre-Kelo instances in which federal courts addressed pretextuality “contested whether any public use would be served by
the taking.”332
In contrast, the particular kind of ‘‘pretext’’ claim the plaintiffs in this
case advance bears an especially dubious jurisprudential pedigree: The
plaintiffs have effectively acknowledged the Project’s rational relationship to numerous well-established public uses, but contend that it is constitutionally impermissible nonetheless because one or more of the government officials who approved it was actually—and improperly—
motivated by a desire to confer a private benefit on Mr. Ratner. . . . [Plaintiffs] seek depositions of pertinent government officials, along with their
emails, confidential communications, and other pre-decisional documents.
They also dispute various plausible assumptions underlying the Project’s
budget.
Allowing such a claim to go forward, founded only on mere suspicion,
would add an unprecedented level of intrusion into the process. . . .
Accordingly, we must reject the notion that, in a single sentence, the
Kelo majority sought sub silentio to overrule Berman, Midkiff, and over a

328. Id. at 52-53.
329. Id. at 55.
330. Id. at 56.
331. Id. at 58-59.
332. Id. at 62 & n.9 (citing Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1175 (E.D. Mo.
2003); Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
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century of precedent and to require federal courts in all cases to give close
scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking rationally related to a classic public
use as a means to gauge the purity of the motives of the various government officials who approved it.333

The Supreme Court of Hawaii in County of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe
Family Partnership took another approach.334 The court asserted that the
presence of even a “classic” public use would not obviate the possibility
that the “actual purpose” was to confer private benefit, and thus the court
permitted a pretextuality defense.335 On the other hand, it agreed with the
Second Circuit in Goldstein v. Pataki336 that the appellants there were seeking “an unprecedented level of intrusion into the process.”337 It then noted
that the C & J Coupe plaintiff did not seek such intrusive review, but rather
“as contemplated by Goldstein, questions ‘the basic legitimacy of the outcome’ and seeks a ‘closer objective scrutiny of the justification being offered.’”338
Other cases have also indicated that the lower courts have yet to come to
grips with the tension between the heightened scrutiny implied in Justice
Stevens’339 and Kennedy’s340 Kelo opinions and the deferential rational basis approach the Court otherwise uses in land use and takings cases.341
These include Carole Media L.L.C. v. New Jersey Transit Co.,342 where the
Third Circuit disregarded evidence inconsistent with the Midkiff “rationally
related to a conceivable public purpose” standard,343 and Rhode Island
Economic Development Corp. v. Parking Co.,344 where the court upheld a
claim of pretextuality in a case where the State Department of Transportation would gain from termination of its contractual obligation.345 None of
the cases considered in this discussion contained any clear indication of
whether the court was applying a rational basis or heightened scrutiny standard, or clear guidance on how trial courts were to proceed on remand or in
future cases.

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. at 62 (citations omitted).
198 P.3d 615 (Haw. 2008).
Id. at 648.
516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
C & J Coupe Family P’ship, 198 P.3d at 649 (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63-64).
Id. (quoting Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63-64).
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 480 (noting the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference”).
550 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 309 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)).
892 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006).
Id. at 106-08.
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“Neither the courts ruling against pretext claims, nor the courts ruling in
favor of such claims, have any consistent, thorough, and rigorous doctrine
governing their adjudication and the scrutiny to be applied.”346 The Supreme Court’s failure to grant certiorari in Kaur v. New York State Urban
Development Corp.347 represents a lost opportunity to provide such clarity.
In the end, the result of analyses such as that of the Second Circuit
would preclude almost all public use pretextuality claims from receiving
meaningful scrutiny. Plaintiffs would be required to submit pleadings
showing with specificity evidence of no public use, or else a “smoking
gun” demonstrating pretextual motivation. Any large revitalization project,
however, would produce at least some public benefit. Even in the case of a
small project, it would not be clear that pretextual explanation equates to
invidious pretextual intent.348 A “smoking gun” would make fine evidence,
but developers and officials collaborating on a project of substantial scope
likely would be sufficiently seasoned and discrete to make this possibility
highly unlikely.349 The outcome would vindicate Justice O’Connor’s sense
of cynicism, or resignation, that “[w]hatever the details of Justice Kennedy’s as-yet-undisclosed test, it is difficult to envision anyone but the ‘stupid
staff[er]’ failing it.”350
IV. GOLDSTEIN, KAUR, AND PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS
The previous section of this Article described how, in its application of
Kelo v. City of New London351 in Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,352 and Kaur v. New York State Urban Development
Corp.,353 the New York Court of Appeals abrogated its duty to meaningfully examine possible instances of eminent domain not for public use. This
Part concludes that this turn in law also is a blunder in public policy. The
very opacity inherent in public-private partnerships and redeveloper selection that contributes to making eminent domain legally objectionable in this
context also makes it bad public policy.

346. Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, TuckIt-Away v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp. at 21, 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010) (No. 10-402).
347. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
348. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text for discussion.
349. See infra notes 416-17 and accompanying text for discussion.
350. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 502 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025-26 & n.12 (1992)).
351. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
352. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
353. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
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Penn Central, Henry George, and Agglomeration Economics
1.

Penn Central in the Court of Appeals: A Georgist Turn

The New York Court of Appeals judgment in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, favoring the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, and against the construction of an office building on
top of Grand Central Terminal, was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.354
The Supreme Court’s Penn Central opinion has been subject to much criticism, largely because its ad hoc multifactor analysis gives little real guidance to lawyers and judges.355
Although the U.S. Supreme Court indeed has been reticent in accepting
or deciding cases that would allow it to refine its takings and public use
doctrine,356 it did criticize Chief Judge Breitel’s New York Court of Appeals’ Penn Central opinion. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,357 it took the New York court to task for its “extreme—and, we think,
unsupportable—view of the relevant calculus” pertaining to the denominator of the takings fraction.358 The Court of Appeals, Lucas continued, had
impermissibly “examined the diminution in a particular parcel’s value produced by a municipal ordinance in light of total value of the takings clai-

354. 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
355. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 679 (2005).
Penn Central lacks doctrinal clarity because of its outright refusal to formulate the
elements of a regulatory taking cause of action, and because of its intellectual
romp through the law of eminent domain that paid scant attention to preexisting
legal doctrine. Its aftermath has become an economic paradise for specialized
lawyers, a burden on the judiciary, as well as an indirect impediment to would-be
home builders, and an economic disaster for would-be home buyers and for society at large.
Id. at 681.
356. See, e.g., Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
357 (2010) (denying review after four justices urged, in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and
Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323 (2005), that the Court review requirement for state litigation to
ripen takings claim against municipalities); Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038
(8th Cir. 2003) (incongruity of allowing only regulatory takings defendant to remove case to
federal court, where Eighth Circuit strongly hinted Supreme Court should grant review);
PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1991) (uncontroverted claims of
government destruction of development applicant’s submissions, case dismissed after oral
argument).
357. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
358. Id. at 1016 n.7 (discussing Penn Cent., 366 N.E.2d at 1276-77, aff’d, 438 U.S. 104
(1978)).
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mant’s other holdings in the vicinity.”359 But that is only the tip of the iceberg.
Chief Judge Breitel, writing for the Court of Appeals, noted the principle, “rooted in the due process clause of the Constitution,” that the State
“may not, by regulation, deprive a property owner of all reasonable return
on his property.”360 He continued, however, by questioning
the extent to which government, when regulating private property, must
assure what is described as a reasonable return on that ingredient of property value created not so much by the efforts of the property owner, but
instead by the accumulated indirect social and direct governmental investment in the physical property, its functions, and its surroundings.361

In his discussion of what gives property value, Chief Judge Breitel continued:
So many of these attributes are not the result of private effort or investment but of opportunities for the utilization or exploitation which an organized society offers to any private enterprise, especially to a public utility, favored by government and the public. These, too, constitute a
background of massive social and governmental investment in the organized community without which the private enterprise could neither exist
nor prosper . . . . It is that privately created and privately managed ingredient which is the property on which the reasonable return is to be based.
All else is society’s contribution by the sweat of its brow and the expenditure of its funds. To that extent society is also entitled to its due.362

Phrases such as “indirect social and direct governmental investment” are
breathtaking in their arrogation of all of the value inhering in a parcel not
demonstrably attributable to activities of its owner to the State. Under this
reasoning, as Professor William Fischel noted, government was “entitled to
appropriate to itself all of the advantages of civilization.”363 It is somewhat
remarkable to see, at this late date, the chief judge of New York adopting
such a Hobbesian view of the relationship of the individual and the State.
Whereas John Locke asserted that individuals enter into a social contract
whereby they institute government to protect their rights,364 Thomas
Hobbes saw anarchy as such a threat to human flourishing, and life itself,

359. Id.
360. Penn Central, 366 N.E.2d at 1272.
361. Id. at 1272-73 (emphasis added).
362. Id. at 1273.
363. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 50
(1995).
364. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION §§ 124-26 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
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that he was willing to grant absolute power to the sovereign.365 “By the
late eighteenth century, ‘Lockean’ ideas on government and revolution
were accepted everywhere in America; they seemed, in fact, a statement of
principles built into English constitutional tradition.”366 Even critics of the
Lockean view have concluded that property rights were the “great focus” of
the Framers,367 and Hobbes’ views correspondingly were disfavored.368 In
a recent regulatory takings case, Justice Kennedy made a cryptic but unmistakable reference to our constitutional tradition of accepting Locke and
rejecting Hobbes. In rejecting the assertion that the State could eliminate
Takings Clause rights of new owners through the simple expedient of
promulgating contrary regulations prior to their purchase, he declared:
“The State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle.”369
The Hobbesian turn of Chief Judge Breitel was abetted by vagueness
and a lack of analysis. He stated “the massive and indistinguishable public,
governmental, and private contributions to a landmark like the Grand Central Terminal are inseparably joint.”370 This led Professor Gideon Kanner
to ask: “Just how one would go about distinguishing the indistinguishable,
and separating the inseparable, the court never took the trouble to explain.”371
2.

Penn Central as Precursor to Agglomeration

Chief Judge Breitel’s insight about societal value in Penn Central was
not altogether wrong. More accurately, it reflects that, mutatis mutandis,
every owner of property derives value from the activity of his or her neighbors and contributes to the value of their respective parcels in return. A
given property owner, therefore is not deriving a windfall, but rather is en-

365. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 70 (Richard Flathman & David Johnston eds., W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc. 1997) (1651).
366. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 87 (1997).
367. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 92 (1990) (“The great focus of
the Framers was the security of basic rights, property in particular, not the implementation
of political liberty.”).
368. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-29, 55-59 (1967).
369. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
370. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (N.Y. 1977),
aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
371. Kanner, supra note 355, at 686.
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meshed in a relationship that Justice Holmes described as “reciprocity of
advantage.”372
New York City’s Midtown business district is vibrant because people
gather there, which might be attributed to suburban railroad commuters desiring to work near Grand Central Terminal and a myriad of other reasons,
comprising “indirect social investment.” As Professor Robert Lucas put it:
“What can people be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if
not for being near other people?”373 While there is no clear owner of the
value generated by such a vibrant web of associations, it seems clear that
those contributing to that wealth would have a strong aversion to its appropriation by outsiders. Professor James Buchanan illustrated this principle
in pointing out that wealthy and distinguished individuals had a marked
preference for joining those private clubs that were owned by the members,
rather than by proprietors, since proprietors could sooner or later charge
each member for enjoying the value of association generated by all of the
other members.374
This kind of arrogation of relationships generating value is not limited to
private social club owners or the New York Court of Appeals. In Brown v.
Legal Foundation of Washington,375 for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court
countenanced the commandeering of the principal of law clients’ trust
funds into Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) accounts, with the
interest generated by those accounts directed for use by legal services programs.376 Brown’s justification, that their lawyers were not entitled to the
money and that the program was limited to funds where it was not practical
to create separate bank accounts for the individual clients, means that the
State is the residual claimant of all value not nailed down in law, even
when those with plausible interests in it work together and undoubtedly
would prefer that the earnings stay within their partnership.377

372. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
373. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
ECON. 3, 39 (1988).
374. James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1 (1965).
375. 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
376. Id. at 237-38.
377. For elaboration, see Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings, Public Use, and Just
Compensation After Brown, 33 ENVTL L. REP. 10807, 10812 (2003) (noting that “neither a
host nor her guest might be able to prove which is the rightful owner of coins found under
the sofa cushion, each would have a better claim to the money than a visiting government
inspector of upholstered furniture”).
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Agglomeration and Public Policy

In the decades since Penn Central, land and housing economists have
come to analyze the synergies that come from the propinquity of people
who could learn from or do business with each other as “agglomeration effects.” The sub-discipline studying why people decide to locate in cities is
referred to as “the New Economic Geography” or “agglomeration economics.”378 A major problem with the dirigiste approach to land use that marks
grand projects such as CityCenter (Las Vegas), and Atlantic Yards (Brooklyn), is that it fails to take into account why people and businesses move to,
within, and from cities.
The traditional Tieboutian model assumes that individuals chose from
competing suburbs or cities to find the mix of amenities provided by government and taxes imposed by government that suits them best.379 While
Chief Judge Breitel was willing to credit “indirect social and direct governmental investment” to the State without examining it further,380 “agglomeration economics”381 “starts with the basic claim that individuals and
businesses make their location decisions on the basis of where other individuals and businesses decide to locate.”382 In other words, Breitel focused
on gathering places, and agglomeration economics focuses on gathering
people.
Countering the attraction to the center resulting from agglomeration is
the repulsion from the center that results from effects of high density, such
as crowding of roads, higher rents, and lack of green space. These reductions in amenities are collectively referred to as “congestion.”383 Somewhat akin is the increase in social bads, such as organized crime, that have
increasing returns to scale. As Professor David Schleicher suggests, these
might better be termed “negative agglomerations.”384
378. See generally David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1507. Schleicher cites foundational work, including Edward L. Glaeser, Are
Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139 (1998) [hereinafter Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?]; Paul
M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002 (1986); Lucas,
supra note 373.
379. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418 (1956).
380. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1272-73 (N.Y.
1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
381. Among other important contributions are EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM (2008); MASAHISA FUJITA, PAUL KRUGMAN, AND ANTHONY J. VENABLES, THE SPATIAL ECONOMY: CITIES, REGIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(1999); and Schleicher, supra note 378.
382. Schleicher, supra note 378, at 1509-10.
383. See Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, supra note 378, at 150.
384. Schleicher, supra note 378, at 1529.
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It is worth noting that the New York Court of Appeals’ approval of a
“civic project” basis for upholding the expansion of the Columbia University campus into Manhattanville in Kaur was based largely on its agglomerative effect.385 Of course, although Columbia might deem its purposes
loftier, the agglomerative effect of its activities differs little from those of,
say, Manhattan’s garment district.386 Notably, however, regulations designed to protect urban manufacturing areas have proved disadvantageous.387
B.

Urban “Blight” as a Metaphor for Contagious Illness

The word “blight” has greatly encouraged and justified condemnation
for revitalization. As described in Professor Wendell Pritchett’s path
breaking article, “blight” is equated to a “public menace.”388 “By elevating
blight into a disease that would destroy the city, renewal advocates broadened the application of the Public Use Clause and at the same time
brought about a re-conceptualization of property rights.”389 The U.S. Supreme Court accepted this model whole, stating in Berman v. Parker390 that
“[t]he experts concluded that if the community were to be healthy, if it
were not to revert again to a blighted or slum area, as though possessed of a
congenital disease, the area must be planned as a whole.”391 Thus, in Berman, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,392 and Kelo v. City of New London,393 the Court has espoused that the remedy for blight is condemnation
and government-directed redevelopment.

385. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 734 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
The indisputably public purpose of education is particularly vital for New York
City and the State to maintain their respective statuses as global centers of higher
education and academic research. To that end, the Project plan includes the construction of facilities dedicated to research and the expansion of laboratories, libraries and student housing.
Id.
386. See Lucas, supra note 373, at 38 (“New York City’s garment district, financial district, diamond district, advertising district and many more are as much intellectual centers as
is Columbia or New York University. The specific ideas exchanged in these centers differ,
of course, from those exchanged in academic circles, but the process is much the same.”).
387. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative
Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2010).
388. Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003).
389. Id. at 3.
390. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
391. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
392. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
393. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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But, as I have elaborated upon elsewhere, abatement is the direct and
proper remedy for blight, not condemnation.394 If the present owners,
lenders, or parties with a potential interest are unwilling or unable to abate
a nuisance, government may do so, impress a betterment lien upon the land,
and foreclose the lien if and when unpaid.395 Encouraging local private initiative and transparency, both important in a well-functioning republic, augur strongly for this approach because the foreclosure process is both public and modest in scale, as opposed to larger redevelopment projects whose
developers are opaquely selected.
C.

Underutilization

Much of the underpinning of the concept of “underutilization” of property as blight is based upon Professor Michael Heller’s thesis of the anticommons.396 But, this is the tail wagging the dog. The numerous shards of
property noted by Heller that prevented the utilization of storefronts in
Moscow were not endogenous to a natural evolution of private property
rights, but rather were fragments resulting from the sudden implosion of
the Soviet Union.397 The real story is that for three-quarters of a century
Russia was governed by a regime that concomitantly repressed both individual property and individual liberty. Overly centralized control of resources deprives individuals of their incentives and ability to apply their
local and tacit knowledge to coordinate resource use.398 Furthermore, as
Heller hints at, rent control and kindred regulations imposed in the name of
(contested) non-utilitarian values also may lead to underutilization.399
Because of concern about ostensible blight, the courts have countenanced the use of eminent domain to acquire small parcels, with the resulting superparcel having a higher aggregate market value. It might, or might
not, have a higher aggregate social value, since condemnation results in the
destruction of large (albeit almost immeasurable) amounts of subjective
value, as well as the imposition of high out of pocket costs.400

394. Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Justify Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833 (2007).
395. Id. at 838.
396. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (1998).
397. See Steven J. Eagle, The Really New Property: A Skeptical Appraisal, 43 IND. L.
REV. 1229, 1250-51 (2010) [hereinafter Eagle, Really New Property].
398. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Private Property, Development and Freedom: On
Taking Our Own Advice, 59 SMU L. REV. 345 (2006) (claiming that the United States evangelizes the free market, transparency, and subsidiarity in countries including those in the
former Soviet Union, but is reluctant to adhere to these principles itself).
399. See Heller, supra note 396, at 671 n.228.
400. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.

EAGLE_CHRISTENSEN

2011]

PUBLIC USE IN THE DIRIGISTE TRADITION

6/7/2011 7:01 PM

1077

As Professor Jonathan Barnett notes, however, market actors whose
roles vary from one transaction to another have strong incentives to “resist
and correct overpropertization.”401 In the urban renewal situation, however, actors do not switch roles. Members of minority groups, persons of
moderate income, and owners of small businesses are the condemnees.
Well-connected redevelopers are post-condemnation transferees, and they
proxy for the upscale businesses and residents that subsequently occupy
their developments. All of these groups have every reason to militate for
more redevelopment.
In New York, the Court of Appeals decisions in Goldstein and Kaur
seem apiece with Chief Judge Breitel’s Georgist views in Penn Central.402
Breitel saw much of the value of property resulting not from efforts of the
landowner, but rather from “a background of massive social and governmental investment in the organized community without which the private
enterprise could neither exist nor prosper.”403 Therefore, the government,
and not the landowner, is entitled to this value upon the exercise of eminent
domain.
A corollary of this view is that an owner who does not utilize his land
productively is depriving society (i.e., the State) of some value that belongs
to it. A more sophisticated form of this argument is that the errant owner is
depriving his neighbors (and society) of a duty owed under some sort of reciprocity of advantage theory.404 One also might analogize the obligation
to the right to provide lateral support to a neighbor’s land or to create conditions that prevent neighbors from enjoying the enhanced value that would
inure to them if those whose lands were contiguous were more industrious.
The State, being the representative of society, can require good uses of land
as well as prohibit bad. There is no such “affirmative police power,” however.
The Court of Appeals’ view also is reminiscent of that of A. C. Pigou,
who recognized that it was necessary for society to rectify social harms that
emanated from some parcels or activities, to the detriment of others.405
Ronald Coase subsequently explained that negative externalities are typically not unilateral, but that activities impinge upon one another not because one is good and the other bad, but because both activities are legiti-

401. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 390 (2009).
402. See supra Part IV.A.
403. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (N.Y. 1977),
aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
404. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
405. See ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160-68 (1920).
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mate, but mutually incompatible.406 While the court’s implicit assumption
seems to be that owners targeted for redevelopment who refuse to sell do so
because they are “holdouts,” the alternative possibility is that “underutilization” in the eyes of redevelopment agencies represents good utilization
from the perspective of the owners. In some highly publicized cases of
eminent domain, the owners’ views might be a better economic choice as
well.407
D.
1.

The Information Problem and Information Paradox
Government Disclosure is Cheap and Private Information is
Expensive

A major problem with eminent domain for private economic redevelopment is asymmetry of information. In his classic article The Economics of
Public Use,408 Professor Thomas Merrill notes the broadest objection to the
use of eminent domain for parcel assembly, that private developers regularly assemble sites for shopping centers and commercial office developments
without eminent domain.409 Merrill’s response is that this might work well
for smaller parcels not strictly site-dependent, and, where anticipated, large
gains could buy off rent seekers.410 More fundamentally, however, while
conceding that straw transactions, options, and similar devices may work
well for private developers, Merrill asserted that their utility for government assembly is limited. “The necessary ingredient of these techniques is
secrecy, and governments, at least in an open society like the United States,
are not very good at keeping secrets.”411 Even if it could keep information
private, the possibilities of government purchasing agents buying off holdouts in secret deals and possibly tipping off potential sellers creates a
“specter of corruption” that might make it prudent for eminent domain to
be used instead of private developers’ “guile.”412

406. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
407. The saga of Susette Kelo is instructive in this regard. See supra Part III.A.
408. Merrill, supra note 239.
409. Id. at 81; see, e.g., Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
[T]he landscape of our country is flecked with shopping centers, office parks,
clusters of hotels, and centers of entertainment and commerce. We do not believe,
and plaintiff does not contend, that these constellations required the exercise of
eminent domain or any other form of collective public action for their formation.
Id. at 783-84.
410. Merrill, supra note 239.
411. Id.
412. Id.
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Another way to look at the fact that government typically must devise its
plans for acquisitions in public view is that obtaining such disclosed information is cheap. Sellers and competing buyers need merely read the local
newspapers or attend city council meetings to find out government’s land
acquisition plans.
But how does government decide whether and where to institute large
urban revitalization projects in the first place? Here it is vital that it ferret
out the information that would lead it to the best decision. But, as Professor Kenneth Arrow noted, information “is an economic good, in the sense
that it is costly and valuable.”413 It is difficult to sell information, however,
since the very process of informing a potential buyer of the reasons why it
is valuable serves to convey the information for free. Also, “there is no
general way of defining units for information,” and information is difficult
to evaluate.414 Yet, information about development opportunities can be
quite lucrative, since one characteristic of information is an “extreme form
of increasing returns.”415 The same bit of information that might be the key
to a small project with modest profits might serve the same function for a
large project with substantial profits.
From the city’s perspective, it is difficult to evaluate the consequences of
accepting a redevelopment proposal. Furthermore, a little-known developer might not have good judgment or prove a reliable partner. Judgment and
reliability, in this context, include avoiding potential embarrassment for local officials, and, perhaps, providing reciprocal value for contracts
awarded. Sponsorship by a well-regarded team player provides the necessary reputational bonding. That is why newcomers may be told, “[w]e
don’t want nobody that nobody sent.”416 Redevelopers that somebody sent
would likely have to justify that patronage in ways that are both circuitous
and difficult to substantiate.417 That one hand washes the other is the truism
of crony capitalism.

413. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Information: An Exposition, 23 EMPIRICA 11928 (1996).
414. Id. at 120.
415. Id.
416. Interview by Harry Kreisler, Conversations with History, Inst. of Int’l Studs., U.C.
Berkley, with Abner Jay Mikva, former Congressman (Apr. 12, 1999), available at
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Mikva/mikva-con2.html. Mikva, later a member of
Congress, a United States Court of Appeals judge, and counsel to President William J. Clinton, related that a “quintessential Chicago Ward committeeman” turned him away with the
those words when he arrived, unsponsored, to volunteer for Adlai Stevenson and Paul
Douglas. Id.
417. An aphorism attributed to Senator Earl Long states: “Don’t write anything you can
phone. Don’t phone anything you can talk. Don’t talk anything you can whisper. Don’t
whisper anything you can smile. Don’t smile anything you can nod. Don’t nod anything
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Crony Capitalism and Urban Revitalization

Government coordination of economic activity means that some actors
are encouraged in certain undertakings. These are of value, in turn, because they are forbidden to others. The beneficiaries of such largess have
acquired “regulatory property,”418 which has been placed in a limited number of hands and is susceptible to removal or dilution by the State. According to Professor John Coffee, however, the presence of dispersed ownership is important for the autonomy of both government and providers of
capital.
This is the dark side of concentrated ownership; put simply, the separation
of cash-flow rights from voting rights can serve as a means by which
those controlling the public sector can extend their control over the private sector. At a minimum, the prospect of crony capitalism—that is,
closely interlocked political and economic leaderships, each reciprocally
assisting the other—ensures that concentrated owners will need to become
deeply involved in government in order to protect their positions from existing rivals, new entrants, and political sycophants.419

As Professor Coffee adds, “[o]nce concentrated ownership degenerates
into a ‘crony capitalism’ that unites political and economic power, the role
of law is likely to become minimal.”420 Professor Timothy Canova described “crony capitalism” as the “tendency of ostensible public-sector regulatory authorities reaching out to help their ‘friends’ in the private sector.”421
Much of the concern about crony capitalism results from concern about
the causes and effects of bailouts of firms by government in time of economic turmoil. For instance, the Financial Times outlined that the rescue
in the late 1990s of Long-Term Capital Management by the Federal Reserve took place in the context of a web of former colleagueship and per-

you can wink.” Earl Long Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
quotes/e/earllong212427.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
418. See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights:
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123,
129 (2001) (coining term and explicating concept).
419. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 72 (2001).
420. Id. at 81.
421. Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1583 (1999) (reporting on American crony
capitalism, conflicts of interest, and lack of transparency).
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sonal friendship between top officials at the Fed and the beneficiaries of its
largess.422
The creation of massive urban redevelopment projects located on sites
taken involuntarily from their previous owners and retransferred to powerful and sometimes politically well-connected new proprietors is fertile
grounds for crony capitalism abuse. Such accusations played an important
role in opposition to New York’s Atlantic Yards project. As suggested earlier, one might conclude that the relationship between a leading bank and
New York State government regarding the World Trade Center, instantiated in the brothers Rockefeller, was not wholly arms-length.423 The
same might be said for the provenance of New York Times coverage of
Bruce Ratner and Atlantic Yards.424
Another example is the recent account describing the allocation of funds
from Chicago’s Tax Increment Financing (TIF) program, which is financed
and administered outside the city’s annual budget. “About $500 million
has gone into the TIF program in each of the last four years, and most financing decisions are made behind closed doors by top city officials and
aldermen.”425
E.

Government, Property, and Coordination

Condemnation for economic revitalization is, at its heart, a tool designed
to bring economic resources to bear in repairing communities.426 The conceit is that the “visible hand” of government, within the context of the regulatory state, can best coordinate activities.427 It is true, as Professors Robert
Ahdieh,428 Michael Heller,429 and others argue, that “[t]he operative challenge is to coordinate property-rights holders around an efficient equili-

422. See John Plender, Western Crony Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at 10 (criticizing incestuous relationships between government and regulatory officials and investment
bankers).
423. See supra notes 53-55.
424. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
425. Mick Dumke, Candidates Question the Ways Tax Increment Financing Is Used,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at A21.
426. Steven J. Eagle, Kelo, Directed Growth and Municipal Industrial Policy, 17 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 63, 64 (2009) [hereinafter Eagle, Directed Growth].
427. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory
State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 584 (2010).
428. Id. at 593-98.
429. See Heller, supra note 396, at 626 (asserting that over-specified property rights in
land preclude effective utilization of property); see generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND
COSTS LIVES (2008) (extending Anticommons principles to air transport congestion, patent
locks precluding pharmaceutical advances, etc.).
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brium of consumption and use.”430 However, that does not mean that the
State is the best agent to make the change. One cannot displace marketbased coordination, which certainly has warts in practice, with an idealized
form of government-coordinated economy.431 In particular, the fact that
real property sometimes is used in what some would deem suboptimal
ways does not prove or even imply that State-driven redevelopment would
do better.432 One illustration of the failure of control to anticipate the full
consequences of its well-intended decisions is the attempt to preserve bluecollar jobs in New York City by prohibiting the conversion of underutilized
loft buildings so as to provide much-needing housing.433
F.

Agglomerate Proliferation

As was noted earlier, agglomeration provides increasing returns to scale
of productive economic and enjoyable cultural and social interactions.434
But, as is the case with critical densities of fissionable nuclear material, the
ensuing chain reactions set off by agglomeration are not always socially
beneficial. The bad effects include negative agglomeration,435 congestion,436 and what I will call agglomerate proliferation. While it is conventional to use the term “congestion” as a catchall for all undesired effects of
agglomeration, I break out proliferation for reasons similar to Professor
Schleicher’s use of negative agglomeration. “Congestion” is an apt metaphor for the disutility resulting from the conflict between things resulting
from an agglomeration that are, in themselves, desirable. Highway congestion resulting from the crowding of highways by workers on their way to
new jobs within a growing agglomerate metropolitan area is the archetype.
Negative agglomeration is not a conflict among goods, and agglomeration
proliferation is not a conflict within an agglomerating area.
“Agglomerate proliferation,” as I use the term, refers not to the growth
of agglomerates, but to their proliferation (or, more precisely, to the proliferation of aspiring agglomerates). Local officials, spurred by their own
dreams, or dreams supplied by erstwhile redevelopers or sport franchise

430. Ahdieh, supra note 427, at 594-95.
431. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 1-2 (1969) (discussing and naming the “nirvana fallacy”). The fallacy first was
described in R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960), noting
comparisons between “a state of laissez faire and some kind of ideal world.”
432. For elaboration, see Eagle, Directed Growth, supra note 426.
433. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 387, at 251.
434. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 383-84 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 383 and accompanying text.
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owners, decide that their towns need to become hubs of economic activity.
“Need” and “desire” are not synonyms, and neither equates to “destiny.”
Owners, or developer’s investors, provide equity financing for projects
that are independently economically justifiable. Often such projects consist
of multiple structures and uses. These may be owned and financed separately and bound together by covenants. The regional shopping center is
the classic example. The principal economic advantage of the shopping
center over the traditional main street is that the most desirable merchants
are able to internalize the positive externalities they generate. On Main
Street, storefront owners can free ride on esteemed retailers who bring
droves of shoppers to the block. In the mall, the sought-after merchant
would insist on internalizing its positive externality by paying a far lower
rent per square foot than merchants who live off the traffic they generate.437
This observation, writ large, is the basis for claims that localities should
subsidize businesses fostering agglomeration.438
Where there is no reasonable assurance that the proposed new development would pay its own way, even after considering ownership structures
and covenants that would provide synergies with complementary land uses,
bringing in government is the logical resort. The proffered explanation involves the creation of public goods, which are both nonrival and nonexcludable. This means that if government contributes to the new development, complementary businesses or competitors would settle in town and
more skilled workers, vendors, lawyers, and accountants familiar with the
industry, and others would flock in. If the city down the freeway could
prosper through agglomeration, why not ours?
During the first part of the nineteenth century, the severe depression that
started in 1837 was due largely to a massive growth in public and private
debt. “The ‘orgy of canal and railroad building and of bank organization’
was spurred by New York’s success with the Erie Canal in 1817.439 States
sought to replicate the New York success story and borrowed money to
fund these internal improvements.”440 Similarly, towns would compete in
subsidization of railroads, in hopes of obtaining service and becoming re-

437. See, e.g., Marcus Gerbich, Shopping Center Rentals: An Empirical Analysis of the
Retail Tenant Mix, 15 J. REAL EST. RES. 283, 284-86 (1998).
438. See infra notes 443-48 and accompanying text.
439. Susan P. Fino, Perspectives: Federal Jurisprudence, State Autonomy: De Tocqueville or Disney? The Rehnquist Court’s Idea of Federalism, 66 ALB. L. REV. 765, 769 (2003)
(quoting Reginald C. McGrane, Some Aspects of American State Debts in the Forties, 38
AM. HIST. REV. 673, 673 (1933)).
440. Id.
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gional distribution hubs.441 “Although these policies could create local agglomerative benefits if only one local government engaged in them, they
did not produce net national economic gain, as they created inefficient subsidy competition, political manipulation of the railroad industry, and overinvestment.”442
Just as prestigious anchor department stores in shopping malls provide
positive externalities in the form of customer traffic to smaller merchants,
Professors Teresa Garcia-Milà and Therese McGuire postulated that desirable firms will supply new jobs and attract synergetic enterprises.443 “Tax
breaks are a means of internalizing the positive externality of agglomeration economics.”444 In theory, such tax preferences can create wealth for
the city granting them and society as a whole, if the city could better capture the positive externalities than other cities.445 The principal illustration
in the Garcia-Milà and McGuire article was the recent move of the Boeing
Company’s headquarters from Seattle to Chicago. Some five hundred
workers, mostly from Seattle, would move into an existing building in Chicago. Chicago provided Boeing $50 million in subsidies.
In commenting upon the Garcia-Milà and McGuire thesis, Todd Sinai
noted that “[t]he authors label the externality ‘benefits from agglomeration,’ but it really could be anything productivity-enhancing: from greater
civic pride to honest-to-goodness knowledge spillovers.”446 He added
“Boeing may have been a ‘loss leader’ for Chicago, not intended to make
existing firms more productive, but to act as a magnet for additional
firms.”447
Cities motivated to become “centers of excellence” in one activity or
another, compete for increases in scale that would lead them to become the
next Detroit or Silicon Valley or Wall Street. However, firms planning to
locate facilities play the subsidy offer of one city against another (as did
railroads) or threaten to leave (as do sports teams). Under these circums-

441. Schleicher, supra note 378, at 1514 (citing Stanley L. Engerman, Some Economic
Issues Relating to Railroad Subsidies and the Evaluation of Land Grants, 32 J. ECON. HIST.
463 (1972)).
442. Id.
443. See generally Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives and the
City, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 95 (William G. Gale & Janet Rothenberg Peck eds., 2002) [hereinafter Milà & McGuire, Tax Incentives].
444. Id. at 114.
445. See Hills & Schleicher, supra note 387, at 263 n.47.
446. Todd Sinai, Comment on Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives
and the City, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 124, 125 (William G.
Gale & Janet Rothenberg Peck eds., 2002).
447. Id. at 129.
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tances, it is easy to dissipate whatever gains might result from agglomeration.
Professor Edward Glaeser enumerated reasons for tax incentives for
firms to locate in a city. These were (1) bids by localities to obtain consumer or producer surplus for existing residents; (2) agglomeration economics; (3) up-front compensation for future tax exploitation; (4) tax discrimination against those rooted in a community and in favor of those freer
to leave; and (5) “corruption and influence.”448
Thus, while agglomeration economics is the account that captures the
imagination, it is difficult to discern whether it is another name for the
largely obscure mixture of motives and relationships that have marked public-private urban land redevelopment.
G. Redevelopment Does Not Embody Superior Knowledge
Professor Richard Schragger notes that the New Economic Geography
literature indicates “the reason some places do well economically and others do poorly may have more to do with luck or path dependency than with
particular legal institutions.”449
Historical accident, path dependence, spatial persistence—these features
of economic geography suggest that uneven economic development is not
an aberration but rather a salient feature of economic life. It also suggests
that chance and very small perturbations in an existing equilibrium can
make a big difference to outcomes. Economic growth does not start from
a clean slate whereby each political jurisdiction can act to ensure its own
prosperity. Geography is not incidental to economy; it is a key feature of
economy.450

Despite the facts that well-conceived development can obtain private financing and that poorly-conceived projects do not deserve public financing, government officials try over and over to find middle ground where
public investment would benefit the locality. The usual lure is economic
development and the positive externalities that the project will generate and
rain upon the city or metropolitan area as a whole.
Common objects of such financing are athletic stadiums, which have a
long history of public support,451 and not coincidentally, played an impor448. Edward Glaeser, Comment on Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, Tax Incentives and the City, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS 114, 116-20
(William G. Gale & Janet Rothenberg Peck eds., 2002).
449. Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV. 1837,
1837 (2010).
450. Id. at 1893.
451. See Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports Teams’
Demands for Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 38-48 (2008).
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tant role in the Atlantic Yards project that was litigated in Goldstein v. New
York State Urban Development Corp.452 As Professor Kenneth Shropshire
noted, the statement most often encountered when sports teams want a new
home is: “We should build a new facility because the economic impact will
be tremendous.”453 However, it is almost impossible to determine whether
a new stadium will have any positive multiplier effect at all. Beyond the
construction phase, which often is a significant factor in mobilizing political support for an urban redevelopment project,454 most payroll of the
sports franchise consists of high-dollar player contracts and low-paid, sporadic employment of custodial and food vendors’ staff. Even more important, most consumer expenditures for tickets, parking, and food substitute
for alternative local uses of the family entertainment budget.455
One overarching theme of the book Sports, Jobs and Taxes, edited by
economists Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, is that no economist has
conducted an independent study showing a positive economic impact on a
city from arena or stadium construction, at least not in the past 30 years.
There is a big difference, they encourage us lay people to understand, between economic activity and economic impact. . . . [E]ven the gross economic activity of a franchise is relatively modest.456

Other studies have shown similar results.457 According to Professor
Zimbalist, “most of the money that gets spent [on sports facilities] is [simp-

452. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009). Although not mentioned in the New York Court of
Appeals’ Goldstein opinion, “[Bruce] Ratner is also the principal owner of the New Jersey
Nets.” Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 2008).
453. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Sports Facility Construction in the Coming Millennium: The
Lawyer’s Role, 16 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 27 (1998) [hereinafter Shropshire, Sports Facility
Construction].
454. See, e.g., Lavine & Oder, supra note 71, at 369 (noting that “the grassroots support
for Atlantic Yards came mostly from groups that received funding from the developer or
expected jobs, like construction unions”).
455. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss et al., Green Jobs Myths, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 326, 390 n.233 (2009).
456. Shropshire, Sports Facility Construction, supra note 453.
457. See SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds. 1997); Dean V. Bairn, Sports Stadiums as
“Wise Investments”: An Evaluation, in HEARTLAND INST. POL’Y STUDY NO. 32 (1990),
available at http:// www.heartland.org/archives/studies/sports/baim2.htm (discussing the
practicality of public investment in stadiums). Cf., Allen R. Sanderson, In Defense of New
Sports Stadiums, Ballparks, and Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 184 (Spring 2000) (arguing that public spending on stadia is reasonable unless disproportionate with expenditures
on highway, airport, and other infrastructure construction).
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ly] recirculated money within the town. It does not generate new value
added.”458
Despite the lack of economic benefit from publicly subsidized sports facilities, they are defended as ways of providing the social value and solidarity that comes from rooting for the home team and giving the host city a national and world identity.459
Beyond stadiums, many well-known eminent domain projects simply
have not worked out,460 and numerous major projects have run into trouble.
In Las Vegas, although the Nevada Supreme Court upheld condemnation
for urban revitalization for the massive “CityCenter Las Vegas” project,461
the market does not share the developers’ enthusiasm.462 Perhaps more
important, an industry research analyst for a leading international commercial real estate brokerage firm noted, “[s]ome of CityCenter’s revenue will
be revenue that Las Vegas didn’t have before, but we project that 70% to
90% will be at the expense of existing properties.”463 The notion that cities
can be brought back to affluence and life by in-migration by suburban empty nesters and members of the young, bright, and hip “creative class,” an
idea associated with Professor Richard Florida,464 seems to have been
overblown.465
Probably the most visible urban revitalization project in the country has
been the Fort Trumbull redevelopment in New London, Connecticut. Pfizer has left New London, the Fort Trumbull redevelopers were unable to obtain funding, and infrastructure for any development such as roads has yet
to be built.466 A July 2010 account in the Hartford Courant began: “The
empty expanse that was once the working-class Fort Trumbull neighbor458. Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 37 (1999) (statement of Professor Andrew Zimbalist).
459. See Edelman, supra note 451, at 50-53.
460. See generally Gideon Kanner, Eminent Domain Projects That Didn’t Quite Work
Out, SR004 ALI-ABA 291 (2009).
461. See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 11
(Nev. 2003) (adopting expansive views of “blight” and “public use”).
462. See, e.g., Alexandra Berzon, Contract Dispute Could Hamper City Center’s Finances, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2010, at B2 (“Contractor claims against City Center . . . could
jeopardize the project’s loan contracts and condo sales, the project said in a recent court filing.”).
463. Denise Kalette, Developers Bet a Fortune on Vegas, NAT’L REAL EST. INV., Jan. 1,
2010 (quoting Jacob Oberman, Dir. of Gaming Res., CB Richard Ellis, Las Vegas, Nev.).
464. RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2002).
465. See Eagle, Really New Property, supra note 397, at 1261-63.
466. Elaine Stoll, Fort Trumbull Developer Asks for More Time, Misses Deadline, THE
[NEW LONDON] DAY, Nov. 27, 2010, at QQ.
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hood in New London is an ever-present reminder of the painful eminent
domain battle that took dozens of homes—and the redevelopment that
didn’t follow.”467 The account noted the possibility of new townhouse
construction, but added that they “wouldn’t be built where the properties
were taken and demolished.”468 Earlier in 2010, The [New London] Day
noted that the transfer of the underlying Fort Trumbull project land, which
was mandated by state law, never had been accomplished and that officials
were equivocating on when that might be done.469 Susette Kelo’s travails
might have been for naught.
Apart from specific redevelopment projects, it might be that the entire
apparatus of government-directed subsidization and condemnation for
sports stadiums, convention centers, shopping centers, and the like is a
chimera.
Professor Edward Glaeser’s research, including data from the 2010 Census, indicates that the basis for sustained regional growth is the personal satisfaction of residents and potential migrants.470 Census data indicate that
population is not moving to high-income areas, or to areas with high
amenity values. Instead, Glaeser states, they are moving to areas where
housing is cheap because building is abundant.471
CONCLUSION
Dissenting in Goldstein, New York Court of Appeals Judge Smith declared:
The whole point of the public use limitation is to prevent takings even
when a state agency deems them desirable. To let the agency itself determine when the public use requirement is satisfied is to make the agency
a judge in its own cause. I think that it is we who should perform the role
of judges . . . .472

467. Kenneth R. Gosselin, A Townhouse Plan and an Electric Boat Purchase Could Undo Some Ill Will In New London’s Fort Trumbull Area, HARTFORD COURANT, July 5, 2010,
at QQ.
468. Id.
469. David Collins, New London Should Take Title to Fort Trumbull, THE [NEW LONDON] DAY, Feb. 7, 2010, at QQ.
470. See Edward L. Glaeser, What Democrats Might Learn From the Census, N.Y. TIMES
ECONOMIX BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/
what-democrats-might-learn-from-the-census/ (noting higher wages, quality of life, and “affordable housing, which typically comes from abundant supply” as the principal factors).
471. See id.
472. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 190 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith,
J., dissenting).
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Condemnation for transfer for private redevelopment may or may not
make sense as a political matter. As a matter of public policy, its justifications are doubtful.473 In a speech weeks after handing down the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Kelo, Justice Stevens acknowledged his personal view
that the “allocation of economic resources that result from the free play of
market forces is more likely to produce acceptable results in the long run
than the best-intentioned plans of public officials.”474 As a matter of law,
however, his promise in Kelo that cases of alleged takings not for public
use “can be confronted if and when they arise”475 has not come to pass, certainly not in New York.

473. See supra Part IV.A.
474. John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 4 (2005).
475. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487 (2005).

